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Abstract:  
This study assesses the industrial relations application of the „loyalty-exit-voice‟ proposition. The 
loyalty concept is linked to reciprocal employer-employee arrangements and examined as a job 
attribute in a vignette questionnaire distributed to low and medium-skilled employees. The 
responses provided by employees in three European countries indicate that reciprocal loyalty 
arrangements, which involve the exchange of higher effort for job security, are one of the most 
desirable job attributes. This attribute exerts a higher impact on the job evaluations provided by 
unionised workers, compared to their non-union counterparts. This pattern is robust to a 
number of methodological considerations. It appears to be an outcome of adaptation to union 
mediated cooperation. Overall the evidence suggests that the loyalty-job evaluation profiles of 
unionised workers are receptive to repeated interaction and negative shocks, such as 
unemployment experience. This is not the case for the non-union workers. Finally, unionised 
workers appear to „voice‟ a lower job satisfaction, but exhibit low „exit‟ intentions, compared to 
the non-unionised labour. 
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1. Introduction 
Human interaction and collective behaviour are often shaped by social norms, i.e. behavioural 
regularities that are based on a socially shared belief about how one ought to behave. Social 
norms are enforced by informal social sanctions (Akerlof, 1980; Fehr and Gächter, 1998). 
Hirschman (1982) suggests that institutions can enforce social norms and induce specific 
behaviours which may finally become part of the behavioural profile of the individual. Such 
profiles may entail self-centered, opportunistic, reciprocal and cooperative behaviour. In some 
occasions, acquired preferences can be internalized and become constraints on behaviour (Ariely, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003; 2006; Carpenter, 2005). Dunlop (1944) was among the first to 
relate this institutional function to collective action by stating that “the institutionalized form of 
collective action may introduce new preferences in the same way the household modifies individual preferences”. In 
addition, “interaction patterns of a given form of collective action could alter preferences and in addition various 
forms of collective action can obviously affect the choice of the group even if preferences remain stable” (Duncan 
and Stafford, 1980). A key mechanism for the establishment of social norms and collective 
behaviour is reciprocity, particularly in environments where the relations and obligations are not 
governed by explicit agreements (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 
2000)1.  
In the industrial relations literature, the loyalty-exit-voice framework suggests that unionised 
workers exhibit distinct behavioural profiles that are shaped by the context of industrial relations 
and the environment of mediation and collective action. Hirschman (1970) originally introduced 
this framework to explain why dissatisfied citizens do not leave their countries or dissatisfied 
customers do not forgo a given product or firm. Freeman and Medoff (1984) applied this idea to 
workplace relations to show that unionised workers are more loyal to their employers than non-
union workers. Their loyalty differs from unswerving faith to the firm and it is likely to be 
„paternalistic‟2 and mediated by the union via the perception that a third body may intervene and 
settle any dispute. Akerlof (1982) emphasizes that loyalty is based on employer-employee 
reciprocity and points out that the concepts of loyalty-exit-voice in industrial relations can be 
expressed in terms of norms and a gift exchange which are partially endogenously determined. 
He also notes that the analysis of labour contracts as partial gift exchange can relate to the view 
                                                          
1 Dohmen et al. (2009) present evidence on the relationship between reciprocity measures and future labour market 
outcomes, such as wages, effort, unemployment and absenteeism.   
2 Paternalism has been described in the context of internal labour markets as the practice of building loyalty and 
fostering individual worker dependence on the employer as an alternative to financial incentives (Doeringer, 1986). 
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of trade unions as a collective voice. Akerlof (1983) also explains value-changing processes that 
can bring about the endogenous emergence of loyalty, labeled as “loyalty filters”. 
The above imply that union membership is related to particular types of social preferences, 
which involve both positive and negative expressions of reciprocity towards the employer, i.e. 
gift exchange and retaliation. Unionised workers are more likely to exercise „voice‟ and raise their 
concerns or even reciprocate in a negative way. However, the negative expressions do not result 
in inducing unionised workers to utilise the option of „exiting‟ an unpleasant situation and thus 
quitting their job. The union literature provides ample empirical evidence regarding the voice and 
exit functions of unionised workers (reviewed in Lewin, 2005). The literature also shows that 
there may be a variable impact of workplace relations and management practices on performance 
in terms of output per worker (Katz, Kochan and Gobeille, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; 
Harter, Schmidt and Hayes, 2002; Kleiner, Leonard and Pilarski, 2002; Bartel, Freeman, et al., 
2003). Furthermore, Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2008) provide evidence on expressions 
of negative reciprocity by unionised workers, in terms of output quality, defective production 
and formal complaints. It is shown that this punishment behaviour takes place when concessions 
are demanded during bargaining disputes and when replacement workers are hired next to 
returning union workers during industrial action. However, direct empirical evidence on the 
attribute of loyalty and its link to reciprocity is scarce (Cahuc and Kramarz, 1997).   
In view of the above, this paper investigates the preferences for arrangements involving 
employer – employee reciprocity and mutual loyalty. A dataset with very rich information on 
semi-skilled employees from three European countries is used. The empirical methodology 
employed is conjoint analysis, a stated preference technique which involves evaluation of 
hypothetical job scenarios. It is shown that the unionised workers exhibit a greater preference for 
reciprocal loyalty compared to their non-union counterparts in evaluating alternative hypothetical 
jobs. This difference in tastes is found to be robust to a number of methodological 
considerations, including the incorporation of individual fixed effects and controls for 
endogenous switching into union membership. Repeated interaction exerts a significant impact 
on the evaluation gap between jobs with and without loyalty for unionised workers, but it does 
not alter the loyalty-evaluation profiles for non-unionised employees. Moreover, recent 
unemployment experience is found to diminish the differences in evaluations of jobs with and 
without the loyalty attribute only for the union workers. Thus, the evidence indicates that a 
higher preference for reciprocal loyalty arises as an outcome of adaptation to union-mediated 
cooperation. The attitudinal structuring and intra-organisational consensus functions of the 
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union can mediate such outcomes (Walton and McKersie, 1991), via communication, 
information, and reputation effects that facilitate the attribution of intentions (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002; McCabe, et al., 2003). Finally, by utilising the stated job satisfaction and 
quitting intensions as proxies for the „voice‟ and „exit‟ functions, this study confirms the findings 
of the literature that unionised workers are more likely to exercise the „voice‟ rather than the 
„exit‟ option.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 offers a brief literature review and outlines the 
empirical strategy, and Section 3 introduces the dataset, the main variables of interest for this 
study and presents summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main methodological issues. Sections 
5 and 6 report and discuss the empirical results, with respect to the job vignette evaluations 
which include the reciprocal loyalty attribute, and the „voice‟ and „exit‟ expressions of the 
employees, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Background and Empirical Strategy 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest that unionised workers are more loyal to their employers 
compared to non-unionised employees. They propose that as a result of organisational loyalty, 
union workers are less likely to quit in response to workplace conflict. Instead, unionised 
workers are more likely to exercise „voice‟, through formal and efficient dispute resolution 
arrangements. Unions provide their employees with a more effective voice to communicate their 
concerns, partly by promoting „legitimacy‟ at the workplace (Freeman, 1976; 1980). Legitimacy is 
related to reciprocal employer-employee arrangements, mediated by the union (Doeringer, 1984).  
The assertion that social preferences for reciprocal „loyalty‟ are more likely to prevail among 
unionised workers can be explained in a number of ways. First, reciprocal behaviour may be 
generated by an innate desire to be kind or hostile in response to kindness or hostility. This, 
along with perceptions of process-related justice (Fuller and Hester, 2001) and relative concerns 
(Farber and Saks, 1980) can induce union formation and membership. Second, an appreciation 
of reciprocal arrangements can rise with exposure and experience, without a shift in tastes, in line 
with Stigler and Becker (1977). Moreover, in situations of repeated interaction with incomplete 
contracts, reputation can deter selfish behaviour. In this sense, the mediating role of the union 
and its ability to facilitate communication, information, and reputation can induce cooperative 
outcomes (Simon, 1951; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ostrom, 1998). Third, the union can be 
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thought to have a norm-enforcing role to its members. Individuals may not be aware of some 
preferences, until they experience a certain situation, in line with the notion of „coherent 
arbitrariness‟ (Ariely et al., 2003; 2006)3. Membership in a social group can also transform 
individuals, leading to internalized roles, norms and values that affect behaviour (Akerlof, 1980; 
Booth, 1985; Bowles, 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; 2005; Goette, Huffman and Meier, 
2006). In a similar fashion, the dominance of a „trait‟ in a group may enhance replication via 
„conformist‟ behaviour and cognitive dissonance4, independently of the payoff to those 
exhibiting the „trait‟. 
Theory and experimental evidence on intension-based reciprocity (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; 
McCabe, et al., 2003) have suggested that the attribution of intensions is pivotal in inducing 
reciprocal responses, and have recently highlighted some interesting patterns. One of the key 
issues for understanding reciprocity is the way agents evaluate the (un-)kindness of an action 
(Stanca, et al., 2009). Studies have shown that cooperators may punish more and target their 
punishment at the defectors (Falk, et al., 2005). Identical consequences trigger different reciprocal 
responses in different environments (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006); communication may influence 
motivation and trustworthy behavior (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006); and social ties induce 
higher punishment, and punishment coordination (even without communication), as social ties 
trigger stronger emotional reactions (Reuben and van Winden, 2008). In the labour market, 
workplace mediation facilitates communication, the revelation of information about intensions 
and reputation during bargaining. These can easily be linked to some of the functions of the 
trade union.   
In similar spirit, the behavioural theory of labour negotiations by Walton and McKersie (19915) 
distinguishes between four types of bargaining prevalent in behaviour during negotiations, i.e. 
distributive, integrative, and importantly attitudinal, and intra-organisational6. The former two 
                                                          
3 A relevant evolutionary view suggests that “cognitive adaptations for social exchange” can generate patterns of reciprocal 
behavior under the influence of environmental stimulae (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 
2000).  
4 Cognitive dissonance involves a situation where people are confronted with a phenomenon that conflicts with 
their previously held beliefs, thus creating internal pressure for an after-the-fact rationalization of the unexpected 
phenomenon (Festinger, 1957). In Akerlof and Dickens (1982), individuals choose their beliefs and then process 
information to reinforce those beliefs. 
5 Originally published in 1965.  
6 Distributive bargaining is a competitive conflict process intended to influence the division of limited resources. 
Integrative bargaining comprises of activities aimed at increasing the joint gain available to the negotiating parties. 
Attitudinal structuring is shaped by activities that influence the attitudes of the parties towards each other. Intra-
organisational bargaining involves negotiation activities within the negotiating parties aimed at achieving consensus, 
and aligning the expectations of chief negotiators/representatives and their constituents/principals.  
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functions are joint decision-making processes, while attitudinal structuring is an interpersonal 
socioeconomic process designed to change attitudes and relationships. Attitudinal structuring 
comprises of activities that influence the attitudes of the parties towards each other and affect 
the social bonds between the units involved, aiming to the benefit of both parties. Moreover, 
intra-organisational bargaining is aimed at achieving consensus within the negotiating parties. 
The authors stress several characteristics of labour negotiations that heighten the attitudinal 
dimensions: the issues themselves often involve human values, and the way in which they are 
handled affects the overall relationship. Moreover, the weapons used often involve sanctions 
which can exert an influence on the tone of the relationship. The relationship between parties is 
usually unique, continuing, and long-term; thus, the attitudinal dimension provides one 
mechanism by which successive negotiations are linked together. Furthermore, they discuss how 
the decline of unionism made intra-organisational bargaining particularly intense, as management 
negotiations find it challenging to develop consensus among members of the relevant negotiating 
bodies, a function that was facilitated by the mediation of union representatives to their 
constituents.   
However, the operationalisation of the loyalty concept, the link to reciprocity and mediation, and 
its empirical investigation are scarce. As a notable exception, Cahuc and Kramarz (1997) 
empirically investigate a mechanism, where power is exchanged for loyalty, and where there is 
delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers. This operation turns out to 
stabilize employment and decrease turnover in a similar fashion to efficiency wages. In a related 
empirical study, Boroff and Lewin (1997) define loyalty as organizational commitment or “the 
degree to which a person identifies with an organization”. They link loyalty to „exit‟ and „voice‟ functions 
of the trade union. However, their empirical study does not fully support the proposition that 
unionized workers are more loyal to their employers than non-union workers. Other expressions 
of loyalty operationalised include: “giving private and public support to the organization” (Rusbult, 
Farrell, et al., 1988) and “organizational citizenship” (Cappelli and Rogovsky, 1998). 
In view of the above limitations and gaps in the literature, this study first examines differences 
between union and non-union workers in the preference for reciprocal loyalty in the 
employment relationship. Preferences regarding various attributes of a job are elicited using a 
vignette questionnaire and conjoint analysis. One of the included job attributes is reciprocal 
employer-employee loyalty, in terms of exchange of job security for higher effort. The approach 
followed assumes that the utility a worker derives from a job stems from specific attributes that 
describe the job, rather than the job per se. The underpinnings of this approach originate in 
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Lancaster (1966; 1971) and Rosen (1974). It is a stated preference methodology rooted in the 
random utility theory (McFadden, 1973; Hanemann, 1984). Thus, the stated utility from a job j is 
expressed as: )( jyj aUU  , where jya is a vector of y job characteristics describing a job j. 
Individuals are indifferent between two jobs 1 and 2, if )()( 21 yy aUaU  . Knowledge of the 
function U(.) makes it possible to calculate trade-off ratios, defined as the extent to which an 
individual may accept less of one job characteristic when compensated by an increase in another 
characteristic, without the overall evaluation of a job being affected. Thus, the trade-off ratio 
between attributes 1 and 2 of a given job is: 
2
1
j
j
a
U
a
U




. The derived trade-off ratios provide a 
measure of the relative importance of a job attribute, such as „loyalty‟, for the union and non-
union workers. Differences in preferences for attributes and tradeoff ratios between the two 
groups are established using a number of robustness checks discussed in the next sections 
Furthermore, this study examines the „voice‟ and „exit‟ expressions of union and non-union 
workers. In the literature, loyalty is assumed to be positively correlated with the exercise of 
„voice‟ and negatively correlated with exit behaviour. Following Hersch and Stone (1990) the 
„voice‟ function is related to the expressed job satisfaction7, while the „exit‟ function of workers is 
revealed by the worker‟s intention to quit the firm in the near future. The literature has 
interpreted the lower job satisfaction of union workers as an expression of the „exit-voice‟ 
mechanism. As a byproduct of loyalty, union workers are more likely to express dissatisfaction 
rather than seek employment elsewhere. Thus, their dissatisfaction is not genuine in the sense 
that it does not lead to quits, but it is instead a device through which the expressed 
dissatisfaction of the unionised workers can offer arguments to strengthen the trade union‟s case 
in its negotiation with the employer for achieving more favourable terms of employment. The 
strategy adopted in investigating this issue aims to exclude alternative explanations of the 
satisfaction differential between union and non-union workers, such as: worse industrial relations 
(Bender and Sloane, 1988), higher tenure, compensating differentials, reverse causality (Borjas, 
1979; Duncan and Stafford, 1980; Kochan and Helfman, 1981; Hersch and Stone, 1990). Finally, 
                                                          
7 Most of the literature interprets the lower job satisfaction of unionized workers as „voice‟. A different view would 
question whether job satisfaction as expressed in surveys, is the same as that expressed to managers and supervisors. 
An alternative measure of „voice‟ is the incidence of formal grievances. However, job satisfaction and grievances are 
found to be negatively related and the empirical evidence indicates that the grievance rates of non-union workers are 
half of that of union workers (Lewin, 2005). A measure of grievance is not available in the dataset used in this study.   
8 
 
voice is linked to the exit behaviour and the main hypothesis examined suggests that ceteris 
paribus, unionized workers will be less likely to quit their jobs.  
 
3.  The Data  
3.1 The Database 
The data used in this study is part of the EPICURUS database, a multi-country project funded 
by the European Commission. The data was collected during the 4th quarter of 2004, in 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Identical 
questionnaires were administered in all countries and were translated in several rounds by native 
speakers, experienced in survey design. Four European companies specializing in surveys were 
employed for the task. They reported no complaints from the respondents or other problems 
associated with the survey. The questionnaires were administered to a homogenous group of 
individuals. The target group was unskilled/semi-skilled employees between the ages of 18 and 
65. The survey included only individuals with low or middle education (i.e. it excluded individuals 
with a 5 or 6 education level in the 1997 ISCED International Classification scale)8. Students, the 
self-employed and employees in fishery and agriculture were also excluded. Around 1,000 
individuals per country were interviewed, with the exception of Greece (800), Spain and Finland 
(300), due to budgetary constraints. The dataset contains the essential demographic information 
and extensive information at the individual and the household level. A large number of questions 
address issues related to current and past job outcomes, job satisfaction and well-being. The 
second part of the questionnaire is designed to elicit workers preferences about jobs and job 
attributes9.  
This study utilises the data from Greece, Netherlands and the United Kingdom to assess the 
„loyalty-exit-voice‟ hypothesis be examining behavioural differences between union and non-
union workers. The surveys for Greece, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are carried 
out by the same company using identical protocols10. Thus, only data for the above counties are 
                                                          
8 A posteriori analysis of background variables shows that the sample successfully represents the targeted population. 
9 An extensive analysis of the questionnaire and the database is available from the authors upon request and is also 
available in the reports to the European Commission (EPICURUS Project, 2004; 2005). Moreover, descriptions of 
other features of the dataset are available in Panos and Theodossiou (2009), and Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009).  
10 The survey was carried out by the INTERVIEWNSS (http://www.interview.nl/), a Dutch-based company with 
wide experience on surveys in the Netherlands and around the world. 
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used to ensure compatibility11. Thus, the sample used comprises of 2,809 individuals, 24% (673) 
of which are union members, and the remaining 76% (2,136) are non-unionised workers. The 
rates of union membership in the sample are: 22.9% in Greece, 29.4% in the Netherlands, and 
19.4% in the United Kingdom. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the sample is 
fairly representative of the observed unionisation rate per country, taking into account that the 
EPICURUS sample includes only low and semi-skilled employees12.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the variables used, their means for the pooled dataset, and the means for the 
union and non-union worker groups respectively. Significance levels from a t-test of differences 
in the means between the two latter groups are also presented. It is shown that union workers 
are more likely to earn higher wages compared to non-union workers. The average PPP-divided 
net monthly wage for the union sample is €1,768 versus €1,586 for the non-union sample. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Union workers have slightly higher weekly 
work hours, with an average of 35.9, as opposed to 34.6 hours for non-union workers. The 
former are more likely to be older, with higher labour market experience and job tenure, more 
likely to be male, married, in permanent jobs, in civil service and the public sector, in large firms, 
and more likely to have received some form of training during the last year. Moreover, union 
workers are more likely to be employed in the industries of „Public Administration and Defence‟, 
„Health and Social Work‟, „Transportation, Storage and Communications‟, „Community, Social 
and Personal Service‟ and „Utilities‟. They are also more likely to be found in occupations such as 
„Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers‟, „Technical and Associate Professional‟, and 
„Craft and Related Trades‟.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
11 Moreover, this choice can also be justified in view of the fact that the three countries are more similar in terms of 
their collective bargaining environments. The Nordic and Scandinavian countries are characterised by very high rates 
of unionisation. Finally the EPICURUS samples for Finland and Spain are of smaller size. The choice of the 3-
country sample ensures the homogeneity of the protocols and procedures used in collecting the data. However, the 
results obtained in the next sections of this study are robust to all possible sample choices, including the 7-country 
sample. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
12 For the purpose of this study union membership is the key factor of interest, rather than other collective 
agreement schemes. This distinction is made clear in the survey questionnaire. The rates of collective agreement 
coverage are larger in the four countries in the sample, 32% in Greece, 77.5% in the Netherlands, and 28.6% in the 
United Kingdom. However, collective wage agreements are not always negotiated by the local trade unions.  
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3.3 Expressions of ‘Exit’ and ‘Voice’ 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the variables related to the workers‟ perception 
regarding the working conditions that they face. These are relevant to the „voice‟ and „exit‟ 
functions. The levels of significance from a t-test of mean differences between union and non-
union workers are also displayed, along with significance levels for differences in the 
distributions. The latter concern the ordinal satisfaction variables and are obtained using both 
two-sample robust rank order tests (Fligner and Policello, 1981) and Mann-Whitney non-
parametric tests. Compared to non-union employees, unionised workers are less satisfied with 
their job overall, and the same pattern holds for the vast majority of the different facets of their 
job. Thus, they are significantly less satisfied with the promotion prospects, their relationship 
with the employer/supervisor, and his/her behaviour, the use of initiative, the work itself, the 
times of work and working hours, the work load and work tension, the level of stress, and the 
physical risk of the job. The only facets that turn out to exhibit an insignificant satisfaction 
difference between the two groups are total pay and job security.  
Moreover, unionised workers are more likely to provide negative assessments regarding the 
environment and the nature of their job, compared to their non-union counterparts. They are 
more likely to find it tiring, dangerous, and physically demanding, and of low quality (noisy, dirty, 
hot, etc.). They are also more likely to report the incidence of a work-related sickness or injury, 
although the difference in the number of individual injuries or illnesses reported is insignificant. 
Hence, union workers provide far more negative assessments of their jobs. This consistently 
lower assessment of the job quality by the union workers could be indicative of either 
employment in jobs of objectively lower quality, or a reflection of the „voice‟ function that has 
been noted in the union literature. It appears that unionised workers „voice‟ their concerns and 
complaints loudly, particularly in periods of workplace conflict. This however, does not indicate 
a higher willingness to leave the firm. It may be interpreted as an outcome of loyalty to the firm 
that induces the perception that the workers may improve their circumstances via the exercise of 
„voice‟ and union mediation.  
In view of the above, it is important to investigate whether such differences between union and 
non-union workers persist after controlling for job characteristics. This would encourage the 
interpretation of the low satisfaction exhibited by the union workers as „voice‟. An indication in 
favour of this interpretation is the fact that unionised workers are much less likely to report that 
they intend to quit their job compared to non-union workers, notwithstanding all the above 
differences in the „voiced‟ expressions of dissatisfaction. As the last row of Table 3 shows, 25% 
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of the unionised workers report that they intend to quit their job in the near future, compared to 
40.5% of the non-unionised. The difference is significant at the 1% level13.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
3.4 The Vignette Questionnaire 
A part of the EPICURUS questionnaire is designed to elicit preferences for job attributes. This is 
accomplished by utilising job vignettes that enable the use of a conjoint analysis approach. The 
main objective of conjoint analysis is to identify the value that individuals attach to the various 
attributes of a good or service, such as a job, a house, health care or the environment14. This 
technique essentially involves four main steps. These are: (1) Identification of the relevant 
characteristics - attributes of the good to be evaluated; (2) Quantification – level assignment to 
the characteristics; (3) Design of scenarios (vignettes), as a combination of the former two steps; 
(4) Preference identification of the respondents, by ranking, rating, or discrete choice (Louviere, 
Hensher and Swait, 2000). Since the number of scenarios increases with the number of 
characteristics and levels, not all of the scenarios generated can be included in a questionnaire as 
the respondents have a finite attention span. Thus, quasi-experimental designs are used to reduce 
the number to a convenient level. The selection of job attributes in the EPICURUS 
questionnaire is based on the literature and prior analysis of the determinants of perceived 
quality at work15.   
The approach followed assumes that a job j may be adequately described by a vector of y 
attributes ya , contained in a job vignette/scenario. Thus, each vignette is defined by ten job 
attributes that were identified as highly important in determining the perception of quality at 
work. The 10 attributes of each vignette are: (1) Net wage (as a percentage increase from the 
current wage); (2) type of contract (e.g., permanent or temporary); (3) working hours; (4) 
working times; (5) access to training opportunities; (6) work organization; (7) control over own 
work; (8) work intensity; (9) age of retirement; (10) and loyalty from the side of the firm and the 
side of the employee. All other aspects of the job described are considered identical to a 
respondent‟s current job, and this is made clear in each vignette.  
                                                          
13 The differences in the summary statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3 are remarkably robust in each country sub-
sample. This feature and the homogeneity of the targeted population allowed the pooling of the data in one sample.  
14 The methodology of conjoint analysis originates in marketing research. There are several applications in 
economics (van Beek, Koopmans and van Praag, 1997; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
van Praag and Theodossiou, 2007; van Soest, Delaney, et al., 2007; Kristensen and Johansson, 2008; Pouliakas and 
Theodossiou, 2009; inter alia).   
15 That analysis was based on the use of available datasets for the countries in the sample, such as the European 
Community Household Survey (ECHP).   
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Respondents are asked to evaluate the vignettes on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the 
least and 10 the most satisfactory job16. Thus, the respondents are induced to trade off some 
characteristics for others and to incorporate the notion of opportunity cost into their decision-
making process. Each respondent is asked to evaluate 5 hypothetical job offers (vignettes), 
involving different levels for each of the attributes. The respondents are also alerted to the fact 
that all other attributes of the hypothetical job are identical to their actual current job. Moreover, 
the values of the ten attributes are distributed at random, in order to eliminate the correlation of 
individual characteristics and vignette attributes. Orthogonality and large variance of the 
vignettes is ensured in the design phase. A typical vignette is reported in Figure 1. Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents the whole range of attributes along with their descriptive statistics for the 
sample, and then for union and non-union workers respectively. Differences in the frequency of 
all attributes between union and non-union workers are statistically insignificant, as ensured in 
the design phase. This feature facilitates the analysis of vignette evaluation for union and non-
union workers separately.     
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A great benefit of this approach is its ability to yield multiple observations per respondent on 
hypothetical decision contexts. It is important that respondents understand, are committed to 
and can respond to the relevant hypothetical scenarios. Care is also taken to avoid any possible 
framing effects. For this reason nowhere in the vignette questionnaire is the union identity issue 
mentioned to respondents17.  
3.5 The Loyalty Attribute 
Preferences regarding various attributes of a job are elicited using conjoint analysis. One of the 
included job attributes is reciprocal employer-employee loyalty. This is conceptualised in the 
vignettes by offering two alternative options: (i) “Loyalty from both sides (employer and employee) is 
required; shirking and low performance is impossible”, and (ii) “The firm requires no loyalty; shirking and low 
performance is possible”. Detailed additional explanations of each attribute were available to the 
respondents upon request.  
                                                          
16 Furthermore, they are asked to reply whether such a job would be acceptable by them. While the analysis in the 
next section uses vignette evaluation as the dependent variable, all findings in this paper are robust to the use of 
vignette acceptability as an alternative form of job evaluation.  
17 A framing effect occurs when choices made under the influence of institutionally determined framing may later be 
repeated even in the absence of the framing effect if the effects of exposure to the object of choice, or dissonance 
reduction effects are strong (Bowles, 1998). In the questionnaire, there are only two questions related to unions 
regarding whether the individual is a member of the union and whether the employer accepts unions. For the typical 
respondent there is a ten-minute time interval between responding to the above questions and the evaluation of the 
vignettes in the last part of the questionnaire.  
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The „Loyalty-No Shirking‟ attribute is explained to the respondent as follows:  “The firm treats you 
with the same norms as the other firms operating in the same labour market, except for the specific attributes 
mentioned above. Loyalty to your employer is required. Thus, you cannot get away with shirking (e.g. by taking 
longer coffee breaks than allowed, by working slowly) and low performance work. The employer has loyalty to you. 
Thus the employer will not fire you for the duration of your contract whatever its length (including lifetime 
contracts)”. The „No Loyalty-Shirking‟ attribute is also explained as: “The firm treats you with the same 
norms as the other firms operating in the same labour market, except for the specific attributes mentioned above. 
No loyalty to your employer is required. Thus, you can get away with shirking (e.g. by taking longer coffee breaks 
than allowed, by working slowly) and low performance work. The employer has no loyalty to you. Thus the 
employer can fire you at any time and you can leave the job at any time too”.   
 
4.  Methodological Issues 
The empirical strategy in this study focuses in identifying differences between union and non-
union workers, first regarding the vignette evaluations and the impact of the job attributes, and 
second on stated job satisfaction and quitting intensions. The summary statistics in Table A1 
suggest that that the distributions of vignette evaluation for union and non-union workers are 
significantly different. A two-sample Robust Rank-Order Test (Fligner and Policello, 1981), 
testing that the two independent groups are sampled from the same population provides a U-
statistic equal to 5.209 (p-value=0.000)18. Moreover, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the two populations come from the same overall distribution at all conventional 
levels (D=0.0441, corrected p-value=0.000). A similar pattern is shown for job satisfaction in 
Table 3. The distributions for the two groups do not come from the same population, as 
indicated by both the robust-rank-order test (U= 2.072; 2-tailed asymptotic p-value=0.0382; 1-
tailed= 0.0191), and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D= 0.0583; corrected p-value=0.055) test. Thus, 
the disaggregation into union and non-union groups is justified. This is reinforced by Chow tests 
for the specifications presented in the following sections.  
4.1 Conjoint Analysis 
In the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate a vector of five alternative job vignettes on a 
scale from 0 to 10. Typically, the ordered probit or logit model is used to estimate the parameters 
                                                          
18 The robust rank-order test is an alternative of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for non-normal populations with 
unequal variances. This test assumes neither normality, nor equal variances, nor equal shape. 
14 
 
that account for respondents‟ rankings of all alternatives. The behavioural foundation of these 
specifications is a random utility model. For individual i, let there be a choice set C with J 
elements, with each element indexed j= 1, 2, . . . , J. Let the vector of attributes for each element 
in the choice set available be denoted αij, and let xi denote the characteristics of each individual. 
The utility of each element in the choice set for each individual is represented as Uij = V(xi, 
αij)+εij = Vij+εij, where Vij is the deterministic component of utility, and εij is the stochastic 
component. Let individual i generate a survey response ri = {ri1, ri2, ... , riJ}, that is, a ranking of 
the choice set in descending order of preference. The probability of a given survey response may 
then be expressed as:  
Pr(ri) = Pr[Ui(ri1)>Ui(ri2)>...>Ui(riJ)] 
The probability of this preference ordering may be decomposed as: 
Pr[Ui(ri1)>Ui(ri2)>...>Ui(riJ)]=Pr[Ui(ri1)>Ui(rij) for j=2, . . . , J] Pr[Ui(ri2)>Ui(rij) for j = 3, . . . , J) ...  
... Pr[Ui(ri,J-1)> Ui(riJ)] 
Hence, the J-dimensional survey response describing the order of preferences is equivalent to J-1 
binary statements of which alternative is preferred, given the censoring of more-preferred 
elements of the full choice set. 
Thus, the conjoint analysis of the impact of each attribute on the vignette evaluation requires the 
creation of a pseudo-panel or so-called „exploded‟ dataset. This is obtained via the pooling of the 
individual responses to each vignette. Since individuals evaluate each job vignette on a discrete 
scale from 0 to 10, their true evaluation is a latent variable, i.e. its true value is not observed 
exactly. The observed evaluation U* is an ordered categorical variable.  
4.2 The COLS Approach for Ordinal Dependent Variables 
One can adopt an appropriate linearization of the ordinal evaluation responses, as an alternative 
to the traditionally used Ordered Probit or Logit techniques19. This is deemed desirable as a 
feature of conjoint analysis is that multiple evaluation responses are collected per individual, 
which violates the assumption of independent errors. Hence, panel econometric techniques are 
used in order to take the potential unobserved heterogeneity into account. In addition, given that 
the study also seeks to correct for selectivity bias it has been necessary to facilitate the estimation 
of the model by adopting an appropriate linearization of the ordinal variable Uij. Moreover, 
cardinal evaluations facilitate the computation of the trade-off ratios between the attributes. This 
                                                          
19 The methodology is outlined below for the case of vignette evaluation, but it is also applicable to the ordinal job 
satisfaction variable [0-10], in which case one needs to ignore the presence of elements that entail vignette attributes 
and the availability of alternatives. 
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study uses the Cardinal OLS (COLS) approach (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004: Ch. 2). 
This assumes that respondents are supplying a cardinal evaluation, but it takes into account that 
they are unable to give precise information about their evaluation, due to the categorical format 
of the responses. This empirical approach requires the assumption that an individual i‟s latent 
evaluation of a job j, ijU , depends on the values of the job‟s y attributes, yija , , as specified in the 
vignettes, and on k individual and current job characteristics, denoted by ikx . Hence:  
 );( , ikyijiij xaUU   (1) 
Since individuals evaluate each job vignette on a discrete scale from 0 to 10, their true evaluation 
is a latent variable, i.e. its true value is not observed exactly. The observed evaluation U* is an 
ordered categorical variable. In the empirical equivalent of (1), if it is assumed that *ijU is a linear 
function of the y attributes, the k individual characteristics, and a random error term, i , then:  
 ijikyijij xaU   ,
*  (2) 
Hence, in this study, *ijU  is transformed by linearising the ordinal evaluation responses. Thus, 
any observed value of the discrete variable *ijU  represents a transformation of the latent 
evaluation ijU  belonging to one of the intervals: [0, 0.5], (0.5, 1], …, (9.5, 10]. Normalizing the 
scale to the [0, 1]-interval, the COLS approach replaces the inexactly known value of ijU by its 
conditional expectation, ijU , according to the following formula (Maddala, 1983, p.366): 
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 . where n(.) and N(.) stand for the normal 
density and distribution functions, respectively, and λ takes its values in {0, 0.05, 0.15, …, 0.95, 
1}.   
After the observed evaluation of the vignette is transformed into the conditional mean of the 
latent evaluation, OLS can be applied to the transformed linear model:  
 ijikyijij XaU   ,
*
 (3) 
where εi is a symmetric error term with mean zero. COLS is shown to yield consistent parameter 
estimates (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), identical to those obtained by ordered probit 
(except for a factor of proportionality), as efficient as probit estimates (Stewart, 1983), but 
computationally much easier.  
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The examination of vignette evaluation requires the creation of a pseudo-panel, based on the 5 
consecutive responses by each individual to the vignettes. Hence, taking into account the 
probable correlation structure between the five individual vignette evaluations, the error term εij 
is decomposed into an individual-specific effect θi  and a white noise component ζij, where 
E(ζij)=0 and  E(θi, ζij)=0. Both random-effect and fixed-effects models are utilized in the analysis 
of the vignette evaluation. However, the random-effects model has the advantage of allowing the 
incorporation of controls for individual and current job characteristics that are invariant across 
responses, such as gender, education etc. The individual random effects account for the 
unobservable characteristics that are constant across each vignette‟s evaluation, but different for 
each individual: for example, individual personal traits such as motivation, ability, aspiration etc. 
Thus, the regression accounts for the fact that given personal characteristics, individuals with 
higher job aspirations will tend to report lower U* than individuals with lower aspirations. This is 
equivalent to rewriting the error structure in Eq. (3) as: 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖𝑗  , where 𝜃𝑖  is the individual 
random effect and 𝜁𝑖𝑗  is the usual error term. Typically, both error terms are assumed to be 
random and uncorrelated with the observable explanatory variables. The equivalent of Eq. (3) is 
estimated for union and non-union workers by random effects, controlling for a number of 
individual characteristics that do not vary across evaluations. Alternatively, the fixed effects 
model allows the estimation of within-individual effects, by allowing for job attributes and time-
invariant unobserved effects to be correlated. Thus, it is desirable to ensure the robustness of the 
results in models where unobserved characteristics, for instance benevolence, are allowed to be 
correlated with the loyalty attribute.  
4.3 Endogenous Switching into Union Membership 
The estimation of equation (3) for union and non-union workers via COLS is subject to an 
endogenous sample selection, since the unobserved determinants of union membership may be 
correlated with unobservables in the job satisfaction equations. The view that preferences and 
attitudes over jobs and their attributes can differ and such differences can pre-exist and even 
induce union formation can not be dismissed a priori. For example, individuals with particular 
types of social preferences, such as loyal or reciprocal types might be more likely to work in 
unionised workplaces or become union members (Farber and Saks, 1980; Fuller and Hester, 
2001). In this case, the correlation of unobservables with union affiliation should be positive. 
Alternatively, such norms and values can be enforced by repeated interaction, or as a „social 
custom‟ prescribed by the workplace mediation practices in unionised firms (Booth, 1984).  
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However, the ratings of jobs with different attributes are only observed after the individual has 
decided to join a trade union. This is also the case with other outcomes of interest, such as the 
stated job satisfaction and quitting intensions. Thus, to ensure robustness, it is important to 
account for endogenous switching into union membership when estimating the determinants of 
the job evaluations of union and non-union workers. This is accomplished via using a Heckman-
type selection correction model (Heckman, 1978; 1979; Lee, 1978; Maddala, 1983). The model 
takes into account the latent propensity of an individual to become a member of a trade union, 
as follows:   
 iiwi xL  
*  (4) 
where L indicates union membership and ω is a normally distributed error term, with  
E(x, ω)=0. In the analysis of vignette evaluation, (4) becomes20:  
 iiwniji xaL   ,
*   (5) 
At least one variable in x must be identifying the selection equation. This should be excluded 
from the evaluation equation (4), i.e. k≤w. The instruments, i.e. the exogenous variables that 
identify the first stage equation for union membership, must be unrelated to the job evaluations 
of union and non-union workers. The choice of instruments in this study benefits from the 
richness of the EPICURUS data, and the availability of rich external data. Two new variables are 
defined, namely Union Recognition and Union Concentration, which are used to identify the union 
membership equation.  
Union Recognition is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm where the individual is 
employed is covered by a collective wage agreement that is negotiated solely by a trade union, 
and the value 0, if it is not covered by a collective wage agreement, or if it is covered by an 
agreement that is not negotiated by a trade union. The summary statistics in Table 2 show that 
39.8% of the individuals in the sample are employed in firms where a trade union is the sole 
negotiator of collective agreements. The statistics for the two groups further show that 74.9% of 
union workers are employed in such firms, as opposed to 28.8% of non-union workers. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Union Concentration is created by the use of two data sources. The 2009 Database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions (Visser, 2009) provides historical data on 90 variables related to 
collective action in 34 countries. A summary measure of concentration of unions at peak and 
                                                          
20 The characteristics of the hypothetical job are incorporated in the first stage probit regression for union 
membership, since it is a reduced form model.  
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sectoral level is used for the three countries. This is generated as the summation of membership 
concentration at central or confederal level (Herfindahl index at central or peak level) and 
membership concentration at the industry level, within confederations (Herfindahl index at 
sectoral level). This measure is then multiplied by the union membership rates by country and 
industry from within the EPICURUS database (and multiplied by ten). The statistics at the 
bottom of Table 3 indicated that the measure for union concentration has a higher value for 
union workers compared to their non-union counterparts, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
The two instruments are used to identify the first stage probit equation for union membership, 
shown in Column 1 of the Appendix Table A2. The three specifications of the Table correspond to 
three different equations for vignette evaluation, job satisfaction, and quitting intensions 
respectively. Although these will be discussed in more detail in the next section, it is important to 
point out that the two variables for Union Recognition and Union Concentration in the middle of the 
table are highly statistically significant and both exert a large positive impact on the probability of 
trade union membership. Moreover, they are jointly significant rejecting the null hypothesis at all 
conventional levels, as indicated by the Wald χ2 tests at the bottom of Table A2 . In the case of 
vignette evaluation, the modified version of eq. (3) that controls for endogenous union 
membership is then estimated for union and non-union workers separately via maximum 
likelihood. This is an efficient estimator that allows for robust standard errors and the clustering 
of the standard errors at the individual level. The latter feature accounts for potential serial 
correlation across the consecutive vignette responses.   
4.4 The Rank-Ordered Logit Model for Conjoint Analysis 
Conceptually, both the COLS and the ordered probit model are appropriate methodologies to 
model rating or ranking data21. However, ratings data, might be seriously flawed if respondents 
use different „anchors‟ in the ratings (Calfee et al., 2001). For example, a respondent who 
generated ratings of 2, 4, 6, 7, and 7 for the five vignettes could have a utility function (up to a 
linear transformation) that is identical to that of a respondent who gave ratings of 5, 7, 9, 10, and 
10. When the data are aggregated across subjects, a common ordering is estimated, and with it a 
common anchoring strategy. If respondents had similar tradeoffs but different anchoring 
strategies, the estimation process would be unable to discriminate between diverse tradeoffs and 
                                                          
21 In this study, the robustness of all the results that are generated with the random effects COLS method is always 
ensured by comparing the results of the next section to those obtained using the random effects ordered probit 
method (available upon request).  
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diverse anchoring strategies. Estimated tradeoffs could therefore be highly unreliable even if 
respondents‟ underlying preferences were very similar22.  
Preferences in case-rank data are typically analysed in the framework of the rank-ordered logit 
(ROLM) model (Beggs et al., 1981), in the spirit of the conventional random utility framework 
(Manski, 1977). Assume again the random utility specification, Uj =β’αj + εj, where β are the 
relative weights associated with the j alternatives, αj, while εj is the random component of the 
ratings. Rank-ordered logit assumes that the disturbance parameter in the random utility function 
takes on an independent type-I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974). The model makes 
full use of all ranking information by repeatedly applying the multinomial logit model to an 
„exploded‟ data set. Each choice set consists of a ranked choice and the lower-ranked 
alternatives. The probability that a given rank ordering will be observed has the closed-form 
solution: Pr⁡[U 𝑟1 > 𝑈 𝑟2 … >  𝑈 𝑟𝑗  ] =  
e𝑥𝑝 β′𝛼(𝑟ℎ )
 exp β′𝛼(𝑟𝑚 )
𝐽
𝑚 =ℎ
𝐽−1
ℎ=1  , where α(rh) is the vector of 
attributes of the alternative ranked h in the ordering. Given an independent sample of N 
individuals facing independent and identically distributed εj, the log-likelihood function to be 
maximized is:  
𝐿 𝛽 =  𝑙𝑛
𝛮
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where α(rih) represents the attributes of the alternative that individual i assigned in ranking h.  
Rank-ordered logit may appear not to suffer from the „spacings‟ problem because it is a purely 
ordinal model that makes no assumptions about utility intervals. For a given choice set, all the 
lower-ranked alternatives simply provide lower utility than the chosen highest-ranked alternative. 
However, the logit model imposes its own spacings restriction, via the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives property, i.e. the assumption that the ratio of choice probabilities depends 
on the ratio of the choices‟ utilities but not on any other alternative‟s utility. This could make it 
appear that a particular alternative has much greater relative utility than it actually has simply 
because it is consistently chosen over a slightly less attractive alternative. Because one does not 
have theoretical grounds for choosing between rankings or ratings data, or between COLS, rank-
ordered logit, or ordered probit, this study explores these alternative approaches in estimating 
                                                          
22 However, in all likelihood respondents tend to have preferences that „bunch‟ some jobs together and space others 
apart. Uneven utility spacings tend to be „smoothed‟ as respondents‟ orderings are aggregated; thus, the spacing 
assumption implied by the ordered probit model may not have a large effect on parameter estimates (Calfee et al., 
2001). 
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the stated preference models. Only the results from the first two approaches are shown for space 
considerations (the latter are available upon request). Thus, it is ensured that the observed 
estimates are robust to the context of choice, i.e. the rating of jobs on a 0-to-10 scale (with 10 
indicating the greatest satisfaction), or the ranking of vignettes, with the most-favoured job 
ranked the highest, and so on.  
 
5.  Job Evaluation and Reciprocal Loyalty 
The last two sections of this study present estimates of the loyalty-exit-voice expressions of 
union and non-union workers. In this section, Loyalty is approximated by the impact of a 
relevant attribute involving reciprocity in a vignette questionnaire. In the next section, the „voice‟ 
and „exit‟ expressions are examined in terms of the stated job satisfaction and quitting intension, 
using non-vignette data from the conventional part of the questionnaire.  
5.1 Vignette Evaluation and the Loyalty Attribute 
Specification (1) in Table 4 presents random effects COLS estimates of vignette evaluation, for the 
union and non-union employees respectively. The COLS model with random effects includes 
control variables for individual and work-related characteristics. Panel (B) presents the 
coefficients and standard errors of the detailed specification. On the top of the Table, Panel (A) 
calculates a point estimate and a standard error for the trade-off ratio between the loyalty and the 
wage attribute. This ratio reflects the wage compensation that the average worker would require 
in exchange for the loss of employer-employee loyalty. The results from the first specification of 
Table 4 indicate that the loyalty attribute exerts a significant positive impact on the evaluations of 
both union and non-union workers. Expectedly, wages and hours of work exert the highest 
impact on the evaluations of alternative job scenaria in both samples. So does the type of 
contract received, with workers having a preference for permanent contracts which entail lower 
risks in terms of job security and compensation compared to other types of contracts. The 
examination of differences in the coefficients between union and non-union workers indicates 
that permanent contracts with no risk of losing the job, and permanent contracts providing 
compensation in case of job loss exert a significantly higher impact on the evaluations of union 
workers, ceteris paribus. So do temporary contracts that entail the possibility of continuation with a 
permanent contract. Although it is shown that job security matters more to unionised workers, 
the impact of the wage change coefficient exerts a smaller impact in the union group than it does 
among the non-unionised workers. The difference in the coefficients is significant at the 5% 
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level using a Wald χ2 test. This can be interpreted in accordance with the evidence in Bewley 
(1998) that non-union workers care more about changes in wages but are relatively insensitive to 
absolute wage levels or wage levels relative to comparable workers in other firms23. In contrast, 
the author finds that union workers care more about wage bargaining outcomes relative to other 
workers.  
Furthermore, the results in Table 4 reveal an interesting and persistent pattern. The effect of the 
loyalty attribute is much higher for the sample of union workers compared to the non-union 
ones. The difference in the coefficients is statistically significant at the 10% level, and the 
calculated trade-off ratios between loyalty and wage changes in Panel (A) indicate that the wage 
compensation required for the loss of loyalty is 19.3% of the current wage for union workers and 
close to 12.1% for non-union workers24. The estimates of the differences in the tradeoff ratios 
are statistically significant at the 5% level, and suggest that unionised workers would have to be 
experience a 60% higher wage increase compared to their non-union counterparts, in order to 
give up the employer-employee loyalty in a job. The above estimates are obtained after 
controlling for a large number of variables, namely, vignette attributes (I), current job 
characteristics that correspond to the vignette attributes, such as wages, hours of work, types of 
contract etc. (II), and other individual and current work-related characteristics, such as education, 
gender marital status, job tenure and experience, sector of work, firm size, occupation, industry, 
and country (III). The majority of the individual and current work-related characteristics do not 
exert a significant impact on job evaluation, and the coefficients are not significantly different 
between union and non-union workers. The exceptions are hours of work and formal retirement 
age on the current job. Unionised workers reporting more hours of work in the current job, and 
those with a higher formal retirement age give higher valuations to the job scenaria, compared to 
their non-union counterparts.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The differences between union and non-union workers, concerning the impact of the loyalty 
attribute and the calculated trade-off ratios, reveal an interesting pattern in the random-effects 
COLS model of Table 4. Union workers give higher evaluations to jobs involving loyalty and no 
shirking arrangements than to those that do not, compared to non-union workers, and the loss 
                                                          
23 This empirical observation contributed to the „coherent arbitrariness‟ conjecture (Ariely et al., 2003; 2006), 
according to which individuals do not have a prior good idea of certain preferences, but formulate these based on 
experience and stimuli provided by the environment. 
24 The loyalty/wage ratios and their standard errors are obtained as point estimates for the nonlinear combination of 
the parameter estimates for the loyalty and wage attributes.  
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of this attribute would require a higher monetary compensation in terms of foregone wage 
increases for the union group. The estimates appear to accord well with the assertion in the 
literature that union workers have a higher preference for loyalty. This loyalty is related to 
employer-employee reciprocal arrangements in this study. Hence, it is important to examine the 
robustness of this finding and its nature, exploring different methodological frameworks and 
potential explanations.  
5.1.1 Robustness I: Individual Fixed Effects 
Specification (3) in Table 5 presents estimates from a COLS model with individual fixed effects for 
union and non-union workers respectively. The model accounts for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity that is constant across evaluations, but is allowed to be correlated with the 
observable characteristics. Thus, unobserved characteristics, such as ability or fairness, which 
could be correlated with the impact of the loyalty attribute, are accounted for. Although the 
model does not allow the incorporation of individual characteristics that are constant across 
evaluations, such as gender, education and current job characteristics, it estimates within-
individual effects, i.e. the coefficients reveal the impact exhibited by changes in the vignette 
attributes within individuals.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The results are in line with the previous estimates from the random effects COLS model. The 
reciprocal loyalty attribute exerts a higher impact on the evaluations made by union workers, 
compared to non-unionised employees. The difference in the coefficients between the two 
groups is significant at the 10% level, and the difference in the loyalty/wage ratios significant at 
the 5% level. The calculated tradeoff ratios suggest that union workers would require a 
compensation equal 19.6% of their current wage, while the figure is 11.9% for the non-union 
workers. Thus, a 64.7% higher wage increase would be required for union workers to give up the 
loyalty attribute. The remaining differences between the two groups are also robust. Thus, wage 
changes exhibit a lower impact on the evaluations of union workers, and so do the permanent 
wage contracts and jobs involving lower intensity in terms of work speed, compared to the 
evaluations of non-union workers.  
5.1.2 Robustness II: Endogenous Switching into Union Membership 
The fixed-effects estimates detailed above indicate that after accounting for individual 
unobserved effects that are likely to be correlated with the preference for reciprocity and loyalty, 
the effect of the relevant attribute and the difference in the magnitude of the effects between the 
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two groups remain unaltered. This is important, because a key candidate explanation of the 
loyalty differences is related to pre-existing individual differences in preferences for such 
attributes. These can lead to endogenous union formation and membership. Thus, such 
preferences might be formed ex-ante i.e. they might be valued by the individual before he/she 
joins the union. In order to account for this possibility, Specification (2) of Table 4 presents the 
estimates from a Heckman-type vignette evaluation model that accounts for endogenous 
switching into union membership status. Coefficients and robust standard errors are presented. 
The latter are clustered at the individual level, to allow for potential serial correlation in the five 
consecutive vignette evaluations by individuals. The identifying restrictions for the first stage 
union membership regressions (presented in Column (1) of Table A2 in the Appendix) involve 
two variables related to union recognition and concentration. A Wald χ2 test with two degrees of 
freedom indicates that all identifying restrictions used are insignificant in predicting vignette 
evaluation for both groups of workers (shown in the bottom of Table 4). They are jointly 
significant in the selection equation. Furthermore, a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test showing 
whether the two instruments should be included in the evaluation equations is used. The LM 
tests for union and non-union workers are not significant at conventional levels. This tentatively 
suggests that the restrictions for identifying the selection effects are adequate. Finally, a Wald test 
accepts the independence of the two equations and thus the model can be consistently estimated 
with COLS.  
The estimation results, after controlling for endogenous switching into the union, show that the 
difference in the impact of the loyalty attribute between union and non-union workers persists. 
Union members require a 62% higher wage increase than non-unions workers in order to accept 
forgoing the loyalty attribute. The difference in the coefficients and trade-off ratios between 
union and non-union members is significant at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. The 
earlier finding that jobs involving permanent contracts or prospects and lower intensity are 
valued more highly by union workers is also confirmed. The results from Specification (2) 
suggest that endogenous switching into union membership does not account for the different 
evaluations of jobs involving reciprocal loyalty that are observed to be higher among union 
workers compared to their non-union counterparts.  
5.1.3 Robustness III: Ranking of Jobs and the Rank-Ordered Logit Model 
A final methodological concern that needs to be addressed in order to establish the robustness 
of the estimated effects involves the consideration that workers may provide rankings of the job 
vignettes they receive, that induce ties to their responses (Calfee et al., 2001). The appropriate 
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model of conjoint analysis that mitigates such concerns is the rank-ordered logit model. 
Specification (4) of Table 5 presents the coefficients and standard errors of the vignette attributes 
from this model of ranked evaluation. Importantly, the results prove robust, and are virtually 
unchanged in terms of the effect of loyalty on the job evaluations by union and non-union 
workers. The coefficients of this attribute are again significantly higher for union workers at the 
10% level. The magnitude of the loyalty/wage tradeoff ratios is slightly altered, with the 
difference between the two groups in the compensation required decreasing at a figure closer to 
50%. Moreover, the differences in the types of contracts that induce higher valuations are no 
longer significant at conventional levels. Given the robustness of the results in terms of all four 
specifications and models employed, one should conclude that the difference in the impact of 
the loyalty attribute between union and non-union workers is a robust result25.  
5.2 Loyalty and Repeated Interaction  
The previous section shows that the difference in the loyalty-job evaluation relationship between 
union and non-union workers is robust to a number of specifications and models used. 
Importantly, it remains robust when endogenous switching into union membership is accounted 
for, and when models with individual fixed effects are estimated. The above are consistent with 
the view that there is an ex post element to the prevalence of loyalty differences between the 
union and non-union groups, i.e. these differences might be induced or strengthened ex-post due 
to membership in a trade union which mediates for reciprocal loyalty arrangements and hence, 
internalised via adaptation. This section investigates this issue, by examining the workers‟ loyalty-
evaluation profiles, focusing on factors that reflect labour market experience and the length of 
the current employment relationship. The objective is to examine whether preferences for loyalty 
are reinforced by experience and tenure on the current job, and if there are differences in these 
interactions between the union and non-union groups.  
Figure 2 presents linear predictions from vignette evaluation COLS regressions with random 
effects, for union and non-union workers. The predictions shown are for jobs with and without 
the loyalty attribute. The 95% confidence intervals are also plotted for each of the two linear 
                                                          
25 Further experimentation with a number of alternative specifications and samples provided results consistent with 
those reported here. These involved: (a) the use of vignette acceptability as a dependent variable capturing an 
alternative form of job evaluation; (b) vignette acceptability included in the list of controls among vignette attributes, 
in vignette evaluation regressions; (c) the estimation of all four specifications for extended country samples in the 
EPICURUS database, involving 4, 5, 6, and all 7 countries. These results provided further evidence of robustness 
and are available upon request from the authors.  
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predictions. The specifications used are similar to Specification (1) of Table 426, and all other 
characteristics are held constant at the mean. The three panels of the figure plot the evaluation 
profiles for jobs involving loyalty and jobs without loyalty, by age, labour market experience and 
tenure, respectively. It is immediately evident from the inspection of the figures that the gap 
between the linear predictions for jobs with and without loyalty is higher for union workers 
compared to the non-unionised employees. The picture is consistent with the coefficients and 
trade-off ratios reported in the last section. Moreover it appears that, ceteris paribus, vignette 
evaluation is negatively related to age and experience, and positively related to tenure.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The confidence intervals for each prediction, and the potential overlap between the two 
predictions for jobs with and without loyalty, indicate that differences in workers‟ evaluations 
between the two types of jobs are less likely to be significant at younger ages, for workers with 
less years of experience in the labour market, and for workers in the first year of tenure in the 
firm. This pattern is very clear for the unionised group. For non-unionised workers, the 95% 
confidence intervals of predicted evaluations for jobs with and without loyalty very seldom 
overlap. Thus, for non-unionised workers, the smaller differences between the two predictions 
are more likely to be persistent across age, experience and tenure profiles. In contrast, the bigger 
difference between the predicted evaluations of the two types of jobs observed for unionised 
workers are made significant for the older workers, with the longer experience, and after the first 
year of tenure in the firm. Thus, the profiles shown for the two groups of workers suggest that 
exposure and repeated interaction are related to a stronger preference for loyalty only among the 
unionised workers. The observed relationship between repeated interaction and a preference for 
reciprocal loyalty for the union group can be justified as an outcome of exposure and experience 
to union mediated interaction and cooperation. Such acquired preferences are typically 
internalised via adaptation.  
5.3 Loyalty and Unemployment Scarring  
In Figure 3, the predicted evaluation-loyalty profiles are plotted for the two groups, by past 
unemployment experience and by past unemployment duration. The literature suggests that past 
unemployment experience and duration exert a „scarring‟ impact, i.e. they have a negative effect 
on the individual‟s earning capacity (Gregory and Jukes, 2001), and well-being (Clark et al., 2001). 
                                                          
26 When age is included in the specification, experience is excluded. In the specification with unemployment in the 
next sub-section, unemployment experience, and weeks in unemployment during the last year are added to the 
previous specification.  
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Thus, although the relevant literature favours the view that norms of reciprocal loyalty are more 
binding among unionised workers compared to their non-union counterparts, the literature also 
suggests that there is a higher incidence of polarisation and militancy in unionised workplaces. 
Thus, loyalty may also involve „voiced‟ expressions of negative reciprocity during periods of 
dispute and confrontation. Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2006; 2008) offer extensive 
evidence of negative reciprocity via acts of retaliation, complaints, and lower performance by 
unionised workers, during periods of industrial action, the hiring of replacement workers by 
employers, and after union defeats in wage bargaining. 
Hence, one may expect that unemployment experience is likely to diminish the loyalty gap in job 
evaluations. This is likely to be more pronounced among unionised workers if the norm of 
loyalty is internalised via exposure to union mediation and adaptation to group norms. The two 
plots in Figure 3 verify that this is the case. Predicted evaluations and 95% confidence intervals 
are shown for jobs with and without loyalty disaggregated by union membership. The horizontal 
axis of the first plot shows unemployment incidence in the year before the survey, and that of 
the second plot shows the logarithm of weeks in unemployment during the previous year27. 
Recent unemployment is shown to be negatively related to alternative job evaluation for union 
workers, and positively related to the evaluations of non-unionised workers. Moreover, it is 
shown that the large evaluation gap between jobs with and without loyalty diminishes for 
unionised workers when unemployment is experienced within the last year. This is not the case 
for the smaller evaluation gap between jobs with and without loyalty, which is observed for the 
non-unionised workers. The difference in the predictions for the two types of jobs remains 
significant for both non-unionised workers with and those without any unemployment 
experience. Moreover, the second plot shows that the gap between the two types of alternative 
jobs becomes insignificant after roughly 5 weeks in unemployment for unionised workers, but it 
takes about 20 weeks to diminish the evaluation-loyalty gap for non-union employees.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
The above suggest that the loyalty-evaluation gap for union workers is affected far more by 
unemployment, compared to the respective profile for non-union workers, which in turn implies 
that differences in attitudes to loyalty. The insignificant differences in evaluations for jobs with 
and without loyalty which appear to increase sooner or only for unionised workers with recent 
unemployment experience can be interpreted as a stronger negative shock-effect of 
                                                          
27 The statistics in Table 3 show that the incidence and duration of recent unemployment are lower among 
unionised workers. 
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unemployment experience to unionised worker loyalty. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
opposite slopes of the unemployment-job evaluation curves of union and non-union workers. 
Such experiences are likely to trigger expressions of negative reciprocity on the current job by the 
union workers, although they are not accompanied by favourable evaluations of alternative jobs 
or intentions to exit the current job. The above are supportive of the loyalty-exit-voice 
proposition and the evidence on negative reciprocity expressions in the literature, when the link 
between loyalty and reciprocity is taken into account. In this sense, unemployment experience 
can be thought to exert a negative shock effect to the positive reciprocity intensions induced by 
union mediation, and disrupt the process of adaptation to group norms.  
Overall, the results can be interpreted as evidence of the „loyalty filtering‟ role of the trade union, 
via attitudinal structuring and intra-organisational consensus. These functions of the union 
mediate the development of norms of reciprocity among union workers. The workers adapt to 
such norms, in a fashion that is both consistent with a shift in tastes towards cooperative 
outcomes through repeated interaction, adaptation and conformist transmission that shape 
preferences. Acquired preferences are applicable to other settings, such as alternative job 
evaluations based on current experience. These processes are facilitated by the interaction with a 
third party, such as the union, that mediates communication and the attribution of intensions 
between employers and employees. Moreover, unemployment experience may disrupt the 
process of adaptation to the group norm of positive reciprocity, and trigger expressions of 
negative reciprocity and retaliation. The union can be thought to provide a large menu of „voice‟ 
expressions to its workers. Mas (2008) reviews evidence from the literature on group 
polarisation, which suggests that participants in group discussions advocate more extreme 
positions compared to non-participants. Thus, strong feedback effects across individuals due to 
social interactions can have persistent and lasting effects on individual behaviour. 
The next section examines the expressions of voice and exit behaviour of workers in their 
current job. First, differences between unionised and non unionised workers in „voice‟ 
expressions mirrored in the reported job satisfaction are examined. Second, differences between 
these groups in the intention to quit the job are studied.  
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6.  Voice and Exit: Job Satisfaction and Quitting Intensions  
This section investigates the evidence offered in Table 3 which suggests that, on average, union 
workers are less satisfied with their jobs compared to non-union employees. The literature points 
out that there are five main reasons for this being so (Borjas, 1979; Duncan and Stafford, 1980; 
Kochan and Helfman, 1981; Hersch and Stone, 1990; Bender and Sloane, 1998). First, it is likely 
that union workers‟ relative dissatisfaction stems from poor industrial relations or from the fact 
that unions form themselves in firms where satisfaction is low anyway. Bender and Sloane (1998) 
find that when controlling for the industrial relations climate, the negative relationship between 
unionisation and satisfaction dwindles to insignificance in many cases. Second, the observed 
lower job satisfaction of unionised workers may be an outcome of a reverse causation in the 
relationship between unionization and job satisfaction. Third, it may reflect a flatter wage-tenure 
profile in the union sector. Fourth, compensating differentials may give rise to a union premium 
for less favourable working conditions. Finally, the lower job satisfaction of union workers may 
be an expression of the exit-voice mechanism. As a by-product of loyalty, union workers are 
more likely to express dissatisfaction rather than seek for employment elsewhere. Thus, this 
„voiced‟ dissatisfaction, reflecting the hope of forcing change, is distinct from „genuine‟ 
dissatisfaction. Following Hersch and Stone (1990), this section investigates the above five 
explanations, by examining the correlates of job satisfaction and quitting intensions using 
regression analysis, after controlling for the features that are relevant to the proposed 
explanations. In addition, it extends their analysis via the more detailed examination of the 
explanations related to the climate of industrial relations and reverse causality.  
Table 6 presents COLS estimates of job satisfaction regressions. The list of explanatory variables 
includes the logarithms of PPP adjusted monthly wage rate, and hours of work, union 
membership status, a vector of personal and job characteristics (gender, education, 
cohabitation/marital status, and the log of the number of children aged less than 16) and a 
vector of work-related characteristics (paid overtime, firm-size, sector of activity, log of tenure, 
experience, permanent job, training during the last year, occupation and industry (1-digit)). 
Coefficients and robust standard errors are reported. Column (1) presents estimates from a 
standard job satisfaction regression, in which explicit working conditions are not included in the 
set of the explanatory variables. In accordance with the literature, unionised workers are less 
satisfied with their job overall, ceteris paribus. The coefficient is -0.108, statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The logarithms of weekly hours of work and job tenure are negatively related to job 
satisfaction. The logarithms of wage rate, paid overtime and experience, along with training and a 
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permanent contract status are positively related to job satisfaction. The male workers are less 
satisfied with their jobs on average. Unsurprisingly, the education variables turn out to exert an 
insignificant impact, since the survey targets the low-skilled, with low levels of education. Finally, 
civil servants appear to draw the highest job satisfaction from their job compared to the other 
four occupational categories‡.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6.1 The Climate of Industrial Relations  
Column 2 of Table 6 presents estimates from a job satisfaction regression that also controls for the 
climate of industrial relations. In the questionnaire, workers are asked to respond to the 
following question: “Do you have a good relationship with your employer/supervisor?” The responses 
allow the construction of a binary variable, approximating the climate of industrial relations. The 
statistics in Table 3 further show that 85.1% of the workers in the sample consider their relations 
with their employer/supervisor as good. The figures are 81.9% for union workers and 86.1% for 
non-union workers. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Alternative measures available in the dataset are responses for the satisfaction with „relations 
with employer/supervisor‟, and satisfaction with „employer’s behaviour‟ (shown in Table 3). However, the 
results when using the latter measures are similar to those presented in Column 2, and they are 
not reported‡. The estimation results in Column 2 of Table 6 show that the negative coefficient for 
the union membership variable is significant at the 1% level, when accounting for the climate of 
industrial relations. The inclusion of the latter variable lowers the magnitude of the union 
coefficient to -0.088, but this falls short of explaining the low level of job satisfaction exhibited 
by the unionised workers.  
6.2 Reverse Causality  
The issue of reverse causality between job satisfaction and union membership can also serve as 
an explanation for the observed lower job satisfaction of union workers. This is examined in 
Table 7, which reports results from the analysis of the membership-job satisfaction link using 
propensity score matching. Consistency of the effects estimated with propensity scores hinges 
upon the assumption that selection into union membership is captured by observables. 
However, unlike linear regression techniques, it computes the differential within the „common 
support‟, i.e. by comparing members and non-members that are similar with respect to 
observable attributes (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). Regression analyses use functional form 
assumptions to project the differential outside the common support, potentially biasing the 
results (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Therefore, it seems important to investigate the membership 
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– job satisfaction issue within the common support. The estimate shown in Table 7 is the effect 
of „treatment on the treated‟ for the whole sample, i.e. the mean difference in satisfaction across 
union members and their matched non-member counterparts. The specification of the probit 
estimator used to generate the propensity scores is presented in Column 2 of Table A2 in the 
Appendix.  
The estimates presented in the first panel of Table 7 are based on nearest neighbour matching, 
and those of the second panel are from kernel-based matching (the latter requires bootstrapped 
standard errors based on 100 replications). Overall, the matching estimates support the findings 
of the regression analysis in Table 6, i.e. the lower job satisfaction exhibited by union workers. In 
both Panels of Table 7, union membership is associated with a negative and statistically 
significant effect on job satisfaction, i.e. between -0.084 and -0.090, similar in magnitude to that 
of Table 6. This confirms the earlier analysis, though the parameter of interest is not the same.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
6.3 Flatter Wage-Tenure Profile  
The flatter wage-tenure profile of unionised workers is another possible explanation of their 
lower job satisfaction. Column 3 of Table 6 presents a specification that examines whether the 
difference in job satisfaction can be explained by the higher tenure of unionised workers (also 
shown in Table 2). An interaction term between the logarithm of job tenure and union 
membership is introduced in the specification of the previous Column 1. Job satisfaction is U-
shaped in job tenure, as revealed by the negative coefficient of the log of tenure. The coefficient 
of the interaction term is small, positive, and statistically insignificant. The effect of union status 
is marginally insignificant (at the 10% level) when the interaction term is included. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient increases. This indicates that the high job tenure alone can not 
explain the lower job satisfaction of unionised workers compared to their non-union 
counterparts.  
6.4 Compensating Wage Differentials  
A fourth alternative explanation of the lower job satisfaction of union members compared to 
non-union workers is that although the former enjoy higher wages, these may reflect 
compensating differentials for jobs of lower quality and unfavourable working conditions. 
Columns 4 and 5 investigate this explanation. In Column 4, two additional variables which account 
for work conditions are introduced in the job satisfaction regression, namely the logarithms of 
the numbers of work related injuries and illnesses during the past two years that caused the 
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employee to take at least one day off-work. Interestingly, both variables exhibit a negative impact 
on job satisfaction but their inclusion does not reduce the significance of the union membership 
and the wage effects28. The magnitude of the union variable is only reduced to -0.084. Yet, union 
workers report a greater incidence of work-related illnesses and injuries compared to the non-
unionized ones. Overall, this might be interpreted as evidence that although work-related injuries 
and illnesses do reduce job satisfaction, they are not sufficient to explain neither the lower job 
satisfaction nor the higher wages of the union workers.  
To further examine the compensating differentials explanation the approach of Hersch and 
Stone (1990) is used which amounts to adding working condition variables in the job satisfaction 
regression. The variables used are similar to those identified by Duncan and Stafford (1980) as 
the most important in explaining the union wage premium. These capture whether the employee 
performs repetitive work such as machine operation, the effort at work, and the ability of the 
employee to put own ideas into practice at work29. Column 4 shows that the former two variables 
are negatively related to job satisfaction, and freedom to put own ideas in practice exerts a 
positive impact. The inclusion of the three variables reduces the magnitude of both the union 
status and wage coefficients. However, the negative union status coefficient remains significant, 
and equals -0.081. The interpretation is that the compensating differentials explanation is not 
sufficient to account for the lower job satisfaction reported by the union members. Overall, the 
above results suggest that union membership has an impact on job satisfaction that is 
independent of wages and working conditions.  
6.5 Exit-Voice: Non-Genuine Dissatisfaction? 
Finally, the exit-voice tradeoff as an explanation of the lower job satisfaction that results from 
the higher loyalty of union workers is investigated. One should expect that if union workers 
report genuinely lower job satisfaction compared to their non-union counterparts then this 
should be reflected on their intention to quit the current job. Using an approach similar to 
Hersch and Stone (1990), logit estimates of the determinants of the intention to quit are 
presented in Table 8. The regressors are union status, job satisfaction, wages, and a set of 
                                                          
28 As another test, interaction terms between injury/illness rates and union membership are introduced. The effect 
of the interaction terms turns out to be statistically insignificant. Results are available upon request.  
29 The variables introduced are: (1) a categorical variable equal to 1 for workers who state that they certainly have a 
repetitive work; (2) an index in the [0, 1] interval, created through the summation of workers‟ stated opinion for the 
intensity of the factors that make their job hard. Responses range from 1 to 5, and the options are: (a) high speed or 
high rhythm, (b) tight deadlines, (c) relationship with the boss or supervisor, (d) colleagues or co-workers. Thus, the 
index is 0 for a worker for whom none of these factors make his/her job hard, and 1, for a worker for whom all of 
these factors make it tough; (3) equal to 1 if the employee is frequently, nearly always or always allowed to put own 
ideas into practice at work. 
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personal and work characteristics. Column 1 presents the estimates for the whole sample using a 
logit regression, where an interaction term between union status and job satisfaction is also 
introduced. Marginal effects and robust standard errors are reported in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 
report the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors, for the union and non-union 
workers respectively, from a linear probability model that controls for endogenous switching into 
union membership30. The first stage regression for union membership is shown in Column 3 of 
Table A2 in the Appendix. The instruments used to identify the selection equation are the union 
recognition and union concentration variables. Moreover, a Wald χ2 test reports differences in the 
coefficients between the two groups.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
For the whole sample, the coefficient of union membership is negative, statistically significant, 
and large. The marginal effect is -0.181, indicating that the union membership reduces quitting 
intentions by 18.1%, i.e. nearly by 50% given the observed and predicted probabilities for 
quitting intensions. The magnitude of the effect is large, comparable to that of an individual 
having a permanent contract. Job satisfaction exerts a negative impact on the propensity to quit. 
The marginal effect is -0.052, significant at the 1% level. Thus, an increase of job satisfaction 
from approximately 6 to 8 (½ standard deviations below the mean to ½ standard deviations 
above the mean) reduces the propensity to quit by 5.2%, i.e. an effect equal to 13.9% in view of 
the quitting intension frequencies. The coefficient of the interaction between union status and 
job satisfaction is insignificant, suggesting that the lower job satisfaction of unionised workers 
does not increase their quitting propensity. In the linear probability model with endogenous 
switching, shown in Columns 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient of job satisfaction is -0.022 for 
unionised workers and -0.049 for the non-union workers. Both effects are statistically significant 
at the 1% level, and the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the 
1% level (Wald χ2 test=6.94).  
Thus, for both union and non-union workers the expressed dissatisfaction does appear to be 
genuine in the sense that it does lead to a higher propensity to quit. However, the effect on the 
propensity to quit is significantly lower for unionised workers. This interpretation of the voice 
explanation is in line with Hersch and Stone (1990) who find that unions do lead to greater 
expressions of dissatisfaction among union workers, even when objective measures of job 
characteristics are held constant, but the dissatisfaction has real consequences for the propensity 
to quit. However, the effect for union workers is nearly half of that for non-union workers.  
                                                          
30 Estimates using the logit model in Columns 2 and 3 do not alter the results and conclusions presented‡.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This study reassesses the „loyalty-exit-voice‟ proposition in its application in the industrial 
relations, using a unique database. The loyalty concept is linked to reciprocal employer-employee 
arrangements and examined as a job attribute in a stated preference framework for low and 
medium-skilled employees in three European countries, i.e. Greece, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. The results show that reciprocal loyalty arrangements, involving the exchange 
of higher effort for job security, are rated by the workers as one of the most desirable job 
attributes. This attribute exerts a higher impact on the job evaluations provided by unionised 
workers, compared to their non-union counterparts. This is a strong pattern, robust to a number 
of methodological considerations. It is also shown that for union members this type of social 
preference is likely to be an outcome of adaptation to union mediated cooperation, as it turns 
out to be stronger for unionised workers with higher job and labour market experience. Yet, 
these do not significantly alter the loyalty-evaluation profile of non-union workers. Moreover, 
recent unemployment experience has a negative effect on the job evaluations and loyalty 
preferences of unionised workers, but it does not alter the respective profiles of non-union 
employees. Overall the evidence suggests that unionised workers are more receptive to 
arrangements involving reciprocity, and this entails both the positive reciprocity via adaptation to 
cooperation, and the reaction to harmful events that may induce negative reciprocity.  
Finally, the examination of attitudes towards the current job confirms the „exit-voice‟ function of 
the union that has been documented in the literature. Union workers express greater 
dissatisfaction with most facets of their current job. This lower job satisfaction can not be 
explained by the climate of industrial relations, the potential reverse causality in the job 
satisfaction - union membership relationship, high tenure, and/or compensating differentials. 
However, unionised workers are less likely to intend to quit their jobs, consistent with their 
aforementioned loyalty explanation. The impact of job satisfaction on the intension to quit the 
job is consistent with the „exit-voice‟ explanation of the low job satisfaction of union workers. 
Thus, although the dissatisfaction of unionised workers appears genuine in terms of its impact 
on the intension to quit the job in the near future, the satisfaction effect is significantly smaller 
for unionised workers, compared to their non-union counterparts.   
The results highlight the „loyalty filtering‟ role of the trade union, in mediating the attitudinal 
structuring and intra-organisational bargaining dimensions of labour negotiations. Reciprocity is 
a key mechanism for the enforcement of social norms and the enhancement of collective action 
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in environments where the relations and obligations are not governed by explicit agreements. 
Communication, information and reputation are pivotal for the attribution of intensions that can 
induce reciprocal responses of both loyalty and retaliation. Moreover, the psychological process 
of adaptation facilitates the strengthening and conformism to group norms. Economic 
institutions can induce specific behaviours and often acquired preferences can be internalised 
and become constraints on behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes:  
‡ The mentioned results that are not shown, due to space considerations, are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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Figure 1 
Typical Vignette 
 
Imagine that, for some reason, you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new one.  
Imagine that after a short time you get several offers.  We will list them on the following screen.  These listed 
job offers do not differ from your current job except for some points we specifically mention.  
 
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the 
best possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?” 
Wage: 20 % more than now per hour 
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay 
Working hours: 20 hours a week 
Working times: Rotating shift system 
Training 
opportunities: 
The employer will offer you a 10-workday training program in the course of the 
year 
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team 
Work conditions: No one controls your work 
Work speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to work 
at high speed 
Retirement: You can retire at age 55 
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms. No loyalty from both sides. Shirking 
and low performance is possible 
  
  
- How would you rate this offer? …… Please, evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst 
possible and 10 the best possible job 
 
- Would this job offer be acceptable to you?.......... Yes/No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Figure 2 
Loyalty-Evaluation profiles and Repeated Interaction 
 
a) Age 
 
b) Experience 
 
c) Tenure 
 
 
Notes:  
The vertical axis shows linear predictions from random-effects COLS vignette evaluation regressions for union and 
non-union workers. 
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Figure 3 
Loyalty-Evaluation profiles and Unemployment 
 
a) Unemployment Experience in the year prior to the survey 
 
 
b) Unemployment duration in the year prior to the survey 
 
 
Notes:  
Comments in Figure 2 apply 
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Table 2 
Selected Summary Statistics for the Pooled Sample: Averages and Mean Differences 
 
Variable 
Pooled 
Sample 
Union 
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Net monthly wage 1,629.5 1,767.9*** 1,585.9 
Weekly working hours  34.9 35.9*** 34.6 
Paid overtime hours 1.23 1.53** 1.13 
Age 38.60 43.07*** 37.19 
Experience  20.82 25.19*** 19.44 
Tenure 9.28 14.29*** 7.70 
Male 50.7% 65.2%*** 46.2% 
Married 53.4% 61.7%*** 50.8% 
No. of children aged less than 16 (No. if ≠0) 0.62 (1.68) 0.61 (1.71) 0.62 (1.67) 
Low education 95.4% 93.3% 96.1%*** 
Permanent contract 86.0% 90.9%*** 84.4% 
Training during last year 37.6% 41.6%** 36.3% 
Work intensity 0.54 0.55 0.54 
Own idea implementation                                                          48.6% 44.1% 50.1%*** 
Machine    57.3% 55.1% 58.0% 
Repetitive work                                                       33.8% 32.8% 34.1% 
Sector    
Private sector 61.2% 41.5% 67.4%*** 
Non-profit 10.2% 10.9% 9.9% 
Civil service 14.9% 28.5%*** 10.6% 
Public sector 13.7% 19.2%*** 12.0% 
Firm Size    
1-10 employees 23.7% 11.3% 27.6%*** 
10-24 employees 15.5% 10.7% 17.0%*** 
25-99 employees 21.2% 22.6% 20.8% 
100-499 employees 20.0% 28.5%*** 17.4% 
More than 500 employees 19.5% 26.9%*** 17.2% 
Occupation    
Managers 3.4% 2.2% 3.8%* 
Professional 2.5% 3.1% 2.3% 
Technical & associate professional 9.4% 11.1%* 8.9% 
Clerical & secretarial 23.6% 21.1% 24.3%* 
Craft & related trades 3.9% 5.2%** 3.5% 
Personal & protective service 4.2% 4.3% 4.2% 
Table 2 continued in next page 
Table 1 
The Sample 
 
 Sample  % Union Membership 
 Sample  
Size 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
EPICURUS 
2004 
ICTWSS[a] 
2004-2005 
E.U. Total[b] 
2006 
E.U. (2006) Blue-Collar: 
Unskilled – Skilled[b]  
Pooled Sample  2,809 673 2,136 24.0% 24.8% 26.7% 18.7%-32.7% 
Greece 800 183 617 22.9% 23.0% 22% 11%-27% 
Netherlands 1,007 296 711 29.4% 22.0% 28% 26%-42% 
United Kingdom 1,002 194 808 19.4% 29.5% 30% 19%-29% 
        
Sources:  
[a] ICTWSS Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions (Visser, 2009): http://www.uva-aias.net/207 
[b] European Commission (2006):  p.25-26. 
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Table 2 continued from last page 
Labouring in mining, construction,  manufacturing & transportation 4.8% 5.5% 4.6% 
Sales and services 15.3% 8.2% 17.6%*** 
Plant & machine operators and  assemblers 4.5% 8.3%*** 3.3% 
Armed forces 1.7% 3.3%*** 1.2% 
Other occupations 26.7% 27.6% 26.4% 
Industry    
Mining & quarrying 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
Utilities 1.4% 3.1%*** 0.8% 
Manufacturing 8.2% 9.1% 8.0% 
Construction 5.8% 6.7% 5.5% 
Trade & repairs 15.1% 7.0% 17.7%*** 
Hotels & restaurants 4.2% 2.4% 4.7%*** 
Transport, storage &  communication 6.9% 9.1%*** 6.2% 
Financial intermediation 5.0% 3.4% 5.5%** 
Real estate & business 1.2% 0.3% 1.5%** 
Other services 13.6% 12.2% 14.0% 
Public administration & defence 7.2% 13.8%*** 5.1% 
Education 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 
Health and social work 9.5% 11.9%** 8.8% 
Community, social and personal service 4.3% 5.8%** 3.9% 
Private households 0.5% 0.1% 0.6%** 
Extra-territorial organisations 0.9% 0.5% 1.0% 
Other activities 12.6% 11.1% 13.1% 
Instruments    
Union recognition 39.8% 74.9%*** 28.8% 
Union concentration 0.84 1.03*** 0.78 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01: From a t-test of mean differences between union and non-union workers. 
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Table 3 
Sample Averages and Mean Differences between Union and Non-Union Workers 
 
 
Pooled Union Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Satisfaction with:    
Job overall 6.85 6.75 6.87** 
Promotion prospects 4.57 4.29 4.66*** 
Total pay 5.39 5.30 5.42 
Relations with employer/supervisor 7.08 6.73 7.19*** 
Job security 7.01 6.97 7.03 
Use of initiative 6.88 6.63 6.96*** 
The work itself 7.06 6.90 7.11*** 
Hours of work 6.96 6.90 6.97* 
Times of work 7.03 6.75 7.11*** 
Employer's behaviour 6.60 6.05 6.78*** 
Work load 6.17 5.80 6.29*** 
Work tension 5.90 5.49 6.03*** 
Level of job stress 5.73 5.24 5.88*** 
Physical risk 6.65 5.96 6.87*** 
Finds job to be:    
Tiring 61.6% 69.2%*** 59.2% 
Of low quality in terms of environment 44.4% 55.3%*** 41.0% 
Dangerous 34.9% 46.2%*** 31.4% 
Physically demanding 28.0% 33.3%*** 26.3% 
Other Characteristics:    
Good industrial relations 85.1% 81.9% 86.1%*** 
Incidence of work-related injury 11.4% 15.9%*** 9.9% 
Incidence of work-related illness 20.1% 25.1%*** 18.5% 
No. of work-related injuries (No. if ≠0) 0.20 (1.86) 0.27** (1.82) 0.17 (1.88) 
No. of work-related illnesses (No. if ≠0) 0.51 (2.69) 0.73* (3.05) 0.44 (2.53) 
Unemployment in last year 9.5% 5.1% 11.0%*** 
No. of weeks in unemploymentt-1 (No. if ≠0) 16.68 0.68 (14.31) 1.82*** (17.02) 
Intension to quit the job in near future 36.7% 25.0% 40.5%*** 
 
Notes: 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01: From a t-test of mean differences between union and non-union workers, and a 
two-sample Fligner-Policello robust rank order test for differences in the distributions for the ordinal satisfaction 
variables. The significance levels obtained from the latter are robust to the use of the Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test.  
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Table 4 
Loyalty: Vignette Evaluation 
 
Specifications with:   
Vignette Attributes and Individual 
Characteristics 
(1) 
COLS with Random Effects 
(2) 
Endogenous Switching COLS 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald χ2 
test 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald χ2 
test 
A) Calculated Trade-Off Ratios:            
Loyalty/%Wage change 0.193*** [0.032]    0.121*** [0.016]    4.05**    0.189*** [0.033]    0.117*** [0.016]    3.85** 
B) Model Specification:           
I. Vignette Attributes           
Loyalty and no shirking                                   0.217*** [0.033]    0.149*** [0.019]    3.18*    0.213*** [0.034]    0.146*** [0.019]    2.86* 
% Net wage change                                 1.123*** [0.051]    1.239*** [0.030]    3.86**    1.122*** [0.060]    1.249*** [0.035]    3.34* 
Log(Weekly working hours)                                         6.341***[1.276]    5.984*** [0.742]    0.06    6.083*** [1.422]    5.854*** [0.815]    0.02 
Log(Week. work.hours) squared                                 -0.951*** [0.184]    0.911*** [0.107]    0.03   -0.915*** [0.205]    -0.893*** [0.118]    0.01 
Log(Days of training) 0.015 [0.011]    0.025*** [0.007]    0.57 0.01 [0.012]    0.021*** [0.007]    0.67 
Age of retirement -0.004 [0.006]    0.005 [0.003]    2.01 -0.003 [0.006]    0.006 [0.004]    1.34 
Age of retirement squared 0.110 [0.093]    -0.028 [0.055]    1.62 0.082 [0.098]    -0.036 [0.056]    1.09 
Type of Contract:            
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    0.438*** [0.063]    0.299*** [0.036]    3.65*    0.429*** [0.068]    0.303*** [0.040]    2.54 
Permanent, risk, compensation                0.285*** [0.069]    0.091**  [0.040]    5.92**    0.290*** [0.074]     0.101**  [0.043]    4.86** 
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   0.046 [0.068]    0.007 [0.039]    0.25 0.043 [0.074]    0.011 [0.042]    0.14 
Temporary, possibility to permanent                      0.355***[0.070]    0.180*** [0.040]    4.77**    0.355*** [0.079]    0.197*** [0.044]    3.03* 
Temporary, possibility to temporary           0.141**  [0.057]    0.240*** [0.033]    2.28    0.136**  [0.056]    0.223*** [0.034]    1.76 
Temporary, no continuation [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Working Schedules           
Flexible working hours                                       0.147*** [0.054]    0.154*** [0.031]    0.01    0.164*** [0.060]    0.187*** [0.033]    0.11 
Office working hours                                      0.001 [0.046]    0.088*** [0.027]    2.71 0.016 [0.050]    0.118*** [0.028]    3.15** 
Rotating shifts                                             -0.139*** [0.045]    -0.075*** [0.026]    1.50   -0.116*** [0.044]      -0.045*   [0.027]    1.91 
Employer decides [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Organisation           
Job not in teamwork                                       0.106*** [0.038]       0.079*** [0.022]    0.38    0.079**  [0.039]    0.069*** [0.022]    0.05 
Job in varying teamwork                                   0.108*** [0.037]       0.078*** [0.021]    0.50    0.101*** [0.037]    0.072*** [0.021]    0.46 
Job has a fixed routine [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Control over Work           
Job has a fixed routine                                   -0.114*** [0.039]     -0.073*** [0.022]    0.82   -0.134*** [0.040]    -0.097*** [0.023]    0.66 
You can choose the order of tasks                         -0.088** [0.042]    -0.018 [0.024]    2.11   -0.100**  [0.042]    -0.033 [0.025]    1.90 
No one controls your work [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Intensity           
Often working at high speed                           [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Sometimes working at high speed                           0.279*** [0.054]       0.131*** [0.031]    5.76**    0.272*** [0.059]    0.125*** [0.034]    4.67** 
Never working at high speed                           0.132*** [0.048]    0.038 [0.028]    2.86*    0.119**  [0.051]    0.024 [0.029]    2.60 
Often tight deadlines                                     -0.089*   [0.048]      -0.056**  [0.028]    0.35 -0.083 [0.053]      -0.049*   [0.029]    0.31 
Sometimes tight deadlines                                    0.104**  [0.050]       0.091*** [0.029]    0.05    0.101*   [0.052]    0.097*** [0.030]    0.00 
Never tight deadlines                              0.158*** [0.057]       0.119*** [0.033]    0.35    0.161*** [0.056]    0.125*** [0.033]    0.31 
II. Relevant Current Job Characteristics          
Log(Monthly wage)                                                    0.020 [0.060]    0.010 [0.026]    0.02 0.022 [0.049]    0.012 [0.026]    0.03 
Log(Weekly hours of work)                                                   0.410***[0.121]       0.083*   [0.045]    6.46**    0.398*** [0.117]      0.083*   [0.044]    6.33** 
Training during the last year                                                 -0.017 [0.051] -0.030 [0.026]    0.05 -0.015 [0.050]    -0.027 [0.025]    0.05 
Log(Formal retirement age)                                                  1.336** [0.589]    0.042 [0.454]    3.03*    1.354*** [0.523]    0.03 [0.403]    4.02** 
Has to retire before 65                                                 0.037 [0.068]    0.034 [0.050]    0.00 0.038 [0.064]    0.035 [0.046]    0.00 
Type of Contract:           
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    -0.182 [0.124]    -0.059 [0.047]    0.86   -0.186**  [0.092]    -0.057 [0.047]    1.58 
Permanent, risk, compensation                -0.080 [0.129]    -0.066 [0.054]    0.01 -0.086 [0.099]    -0.062 [0.052]    0.05 
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   -0.176 [0.140]    -0.028 [0.056]    0.96 -0.175 [0.107]    -0.026 [0.055]    1.54 
Temporary, possibility to permanent                   -0.054 [0.197]    -0.001 [0.087]    0.06 -0.055 [0.187]    0.002 [0.079]    0.08 
Temporary, possibility to temporary           0.108 [0.174]    0.008 [0.070]    0.28 0.113 [0.149]    0.015 [0.069]    0.36 
Temporary, no continuation [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Working Schedules           
Fixed working hours                                            -0.114 [0.091]    -0.005 [0.049]    1.11 -0.11 [0.095]    -0.011 [0.048]    0.88 
Table 4 continued in next page 
47 
 
Table 4 continued from last page 
 Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald 
χ2 test 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald  
χ2 test 
Rotating shifts                                            -0.029 [0.094]    0.059 [0.057]    0.65 -0.025 [0.093]    0.06 [0.055]    0.62 
Variable, employee decides                                    -0.067 [0.114]    0.057 [0.059]    0.93 -0.063 [0.119]    0.049 [0.059]    0.71 
Variable, negotiated -0.124 [0.108]    0.017 [0.057]    1.33 -0.117 [0.105]    0.006 [0.057]    1.07 
Variable, employer decides  [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Organisation           
Job not in teamwork                                       0.003 [0.066]    -0.021 [0.033]    0.11 -0.001 [0.066]    -0.022 [0.033]    0.08 
Job in varying teamwork                                   0.032 [0.058]    -0.034 [0.033]    0.96 0.032 [0.053]    -0.036 [0.033]    1.19 
Job has a fixed routine [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Control over Work           
Job has a fixed routine                                   -0.072 [0.094]    0.05 [0.049]    1.33 -0.076 [0.096]    0.048 [0.053]    1.27 
You can choose the order of tasks                         0.009 [0.089]    0.04 [0.044]    0.10 0.005 [0.092]    0.037 [0.048]    0.10 
No one controls your work [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Intensity           
Often working at high speed                           -0.026 [0.077]    -0.05 [0.040]    0.07 -0.028 [0.076]    -0.048 [0.040]    0.06 
Sometimes working at high speed                           0.086 [0.068]    0.007 [0.035]    1.07 0.084 [0.066]    0.007 [0.035]    1.06 
Never working at high speed                        [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Often tight deadlines                                     0.082 [0.074]       0.111*** [0.039]    0.12 0.081 [0.070]     0.109**  [0.042]    0.11 
Sometimes tight deadlines                                 0.066 [0.070]    0.04 [0.037]    0.11 0.062 [0.068]    0.036 [0.039]    0.11 
Never tight deadlines                              [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
III. Other Characteristics           
Low education                                                   -0.076 [0.098]    -0.073 [0.068]    0.00 -0.08 [0.099]    -0.075 [0.070]    0.00 
Male                                                      -0.036 [0.060]    0.034 [0.028]    1.13 -0.039 [0.051]    0.038 [0.027]    1.76 
Married                                                      0.111*   [0.057]    0.030 [0.027]    1.60    0.117**  [0.051]    0.030 [0.027]    2.29 
Log(No. of children aged<16) -0.024 [0.050]    -0.018 [0.026]    0.01 -0.026 [0.045]    -0.017 [0.026]    0.03 
Log(Experience)                                               -0.066 [0.050]     -0.081*** [0.019]    0.08 -0.073 [0.051]    -0.079*** [0.018]    0.02 
Log(Tenure)                                                   0.009 [0.031]    0.006 [0.015]    0.01 0.010 [0.034]    0.010 [0.018]    0.00 
Sector [4] {+} {+}  {+} {+}  
Firm size [5] {+} {+}  {+} {+}  
Occupations [11] {+} {+}  {+} {+}  
Industry [17] {+} {+}  {+} {+}  
Greece                                                    -0.013 [0.085]    -0.035 [0.044]    0.05 -0.013 [0.079]    -0.036 [0.043]    0.07 
Netherlands                                               0.003 [0.062]       0.102*** [0.031]    2.10 0.002 [0.059]    0.106*** [0.030]    2.43 
United Kingdom [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Constant                                                   -18.29*** [3.332]     -10.76*** [2.320]      -17.82*** [3.083]     -10.48*** [2.171]     
lnσ                                                     - -    -0.254*** [0.025]    -0.231*** [0.013]     
ρ                                                      - -  -0.042 [0.102]    0.020 [0.086]     
         
C) Test Statistics (p-values in parentheses)          
Chow (Wald χ2) test      189.15***  (0.000)  
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 0.044****  (0.000)  
Two-Sample Fligner-Policello Robust Rank Order Test   5.209***  (0.000)  
1st stage: Wald χ2(2)  for joint significance of restrictions    145.73***  (0.000)  
2nd stage: Wald F(2)  for joint significance of excluded    1.26  (0.285) 0.38  (0.685)  
2nd stage: LM(2)  test for omitted variables      4.03  (0.133) 0.86  (0.650)  
Wald χ2test for independence (ρ=0)     0.23  (0.631)  
                      
Number of obs. (individuals)                                                         2,968 (598) 9,341 (1,876)  12,309  
R2 (overall)                                                      0.288  0.266   -  
Log-likelihood -  -   -19,511.5             
σu  / σε                                          0.411 /0.679 0.372 /0.705  -  
ρ                                                       0.268  0.218   -  
χ2                                                       1,318.1***  3,867.7***   1,273.8***  
            
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Loyalty/Wage ratio is derived as a point estimate and standard error for the 
non-linear combination of the estimates for the two attributes. The Wald χ2 test is equal to: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓 .𝑈𝑊 −𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓 .𝑁𝑈𝑊  
2
𝑆.𝐸 .𝑈𝑊
2 +𝑆.𝐸 .𝑁𝑈𝑊
2 . The critical 
values from the χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom are: 1%: 6.635; 5%: 3.841; 10%: 2.706. The estimation method in 
the endogenous switching regression model is maximum-likelihood with robust standard errors, clustered at the individual 
level.      
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Table 5 
Loyalty: Vignette Evaluation 
 
Specifications with:   
Vignette Attributes 
(3) 
COLS with Fixed Effects 
(4) 
Rank-Ordered Logit 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald χ2 
test 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald χ2 
test 
A) Calculated Trade-Off Ratios‡:            
Loyalty/%Wage change 0.196*** [0.032] 0.119*** [0.016] 4.63** 0.215*** [0.034] 0.143*** [0.017] 3.59* 
B) Model Specification – Vignette Attributes  
Loyalty and no shirking                                   0.213*** [0.032] 0.146*** [0.018] 3.33* 0.487*** [0.073] 0.347*** [0.040] 2.83* 
% Net wage change                                 1.087*** [0.050] 1.223*** [0.029] 5.42** 2.262*** [0.119] 2.422*** [0.067] 1.37 
Log(Weekly working hours)                                         6.715*** [1.315] 6.354*** [0.783] 0.06 16.867*** [3.017] 14.220*** [1.671] 0.59 
Log(Week. work. hours) squared                                 -1.004*** [0.189] -0.963*** [0.113] 0.04 -2.518*** [0.434] -2.154*** [0.241] 0.54 
Log(Days of training) 0.023** [0.011] 0.027*** [0.007] 0.11 0.063** [0.026] 0.066*** [0.015] 0.01 
Age of retirement -0.002 [0.006] 0.005 [0.003] 0.92 -0.004 [0.013] 0.016** [0.007] 1.90 
Age of retirement squared 0.069 [0.093] -0.024 [0.055] 0.76 0.182 [0.208] -0.145 [0.115] 1.89 
Type of Contract:            
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    0.400*** [0.062] 0.316*** [0.036] 1.41 0.698*** [0.145] 0.575*** [0.078] 0.56 
Permanent, risk, compensation                0.276*** [0.068] 0.107*** [0.040] 4.66** 0.435*** [0.155] 0.192** [0.084] 1.90 
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   0.044 [0.069] 0.052 [0.040] 0.01 0.117 [0.159] 0.102 [0.085] 0.01 
Temporary, possibility to permanent                   0.330*** [0.072] 0.193*** [0.043] 2.68* 0.534*** [0.169] 0.310*** [0.092] 1.36 
Temporary, possibility to temporary           0.145** [0.058] 0.280*** [0.034] 4.06** 0.347*** [0.131] 0.543*** [0.073] 1.70 
Temporary, no continuation [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Working Schedules           
Flexible working hours                                    0.109* [0.057] 0.127*** [0.033] 0.08 -0.057 [0.127] 0.202*** [0.070] 3.18* 
Office working hours                                      -0.016 [0.049] 0.062** [0.029] 1.87 -0.241** [0.110] 0.051 [0.061] 5.41** 
Rotating shifts                                           -0.150*** [0.045] -0.110*** [0.026] 0.58 -0.455*** [0.102] -0.255*** [0.056] 2.98* 
Employer decides [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Organisation           
Job not in teamwork                                       0.125*** [0.037] 0.081*** [0.022] 1.07 0.341*** [0.083] 0.174*** [0.046] 3.06* 
Job in varying teamwork                                   0.092** [0.037] 0.094*** [0.021] 0.01 0.280*** [0.085] 0.213*** [0.046] 0.48 
Job has a fixed routine [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Control over Work           
Job has a fixed routine                                   -0.121*** [0.041] -0.029 [0.024] 3.75* -0.226** [0.091] -0.086* [0.049] 1.83 
You can choose the order of tasks                         -0.091** [0.043] 0.012 [0.025] 4.23 -0.078 [0.094] 0.036 [0.052] 1.12 
No one controls your work [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Work Intensity           
Often working at high speed                           [Ref.] [Ref.]  [Ref.] [Ref.]  
Sometimes working at high speed                           0.301*** [0.055] 0.117*** [0.032] 8.44*** 0.848*** [0.124] 0.374*** [0.067] 11.32*** 
Never working at high speed                        0.159*** [0.050] 0.044 [0.029] 3.87* 0.452*** [0.111] 0.131** [0.061] 6.40 
Often tight deadlines                                     -0.06 [0.051] -0.055* [0.030] 0.01 0.038 [0.114] -0.055 [0.064] 0.51 
Sometimes tight deadlines                                 0.127** [0.052] 0.083*** [0.031] 0.53 0.379*** [0.117] 0.269*** [0.064] 0.67 
Never tight deadlines                              0.144** [0.056] 0.135*** [0.032] 0.02 0.435*** [0.131] 0.418*** [0.071] 0.01 
Constant                                                  -12.01*** [2.286] -11.16*** [1.362]  -  -   
           Number of obs. (individuals)                                                         3,312 (668) 10,559 (2,122)  3,312 (668) 10,559 (2,122)  
R2 (pseudo/overall)                                                     0.230 0.241  0.199 0.199  
σu  / σε                                          0.541 0.682 0.506 0.710  - -    
ρ                                                      0.387 0.337  - -  
Log-likelihood                                                       -3,044.5 -10,170.6  -1,873.1 -6,228.3  
LR χ2 /  F-stat                                                      52.1*** 162.7***  932.3*** 3,090.9***  
           Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients and standard errors are shown.  
The comments at the bottom of Table 4 apply.  
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Table 6 
Voice: Job Satisfaction 
 
                                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Baseline 
Industrial 
Relations Tenure 
Compensating  
Differentials 
Log(Net monthly wage) 0.062** 0.057* 0.062** 0.052* 0.035 
                                                          [0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.031] [0.029] 
Log(Weekly working hours) -0.119** -0.116** -0.119** -0.096* -0.087* 
                                                          [0.053] [0.051] [0.053] [0.053] [0.051] 
Log(Paid overtime hours) 0.046** 0.041** 0.046** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
                                                          [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] 
Male -0.065* -0.046 -0.065* -0.066** -0.058* 
                                                          [0.034] [0.032] [0.034] [0.033] [0.032] 
Married                                                   0.041 0.023 0.041 0.028 0.05 
                                                          [0.033] [0.031] [0.033] [0.032] [0.031] 
Log(Number of children aged<16) 0.011 -0.006 0.011 0.014 -0.015 
                                                          [0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030] [0.029] 
Log(Experience)                                    0.056** 0.048** 0.056** 0.059** 0.040* 
                                                          [0.025] [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] 
Log(Tenure)                                              -0.035** -0.027 -0.037* -0.038** -0.041** 
                                                          [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] 
Trade union member -0.108*** -0.088*** -0.125 -0.084** -0.081** 
                                                          [0.035] [0.033] [0.079] [0.035] [0.033] 
Good industrial relations - 0.563*** - - - 
                                                           [0.036]    
Trade union member*Log(Tenure) - - 0.008 - - 
                                                            [0.033]   
Log(No. of work-related injuries)                                                  - - - -0.189*** - 
                                                             [0.048]  
Log(No. of work-related illnesses)                                                  - - - -0.160*** - 
                                                             [0.031]  
Work intensity - - - - -0.709*** 
                                                              [0.071] 
Own idea implementation - - - - 0.290*** 
                                                              [0.027] 
Repetitive work - - - - -0.197*** 
                                                              [0.030] 
Permanent Job 0.108** 0.096** 0.108** 0.095** 0.123*** 
                                                          [0.044] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044] [0.042] 
Training during the last year 0.153*** 0.128*** 0.152*** 0.148*** 0.101*** 
                                                          [0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030] [0.029] 
Greece                                           0.275*** 0.208*** 0.276*** 0.241*** 0.425*** 
                                                          [0.046] [0.044] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] 
Netherlands                                  0.323*** 0.338*** 0.323*** 0.312*** 0.282*** 
                                                          [0.040] [0.038] [0.040] [0.039] [0.038] 
Education [4] {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
Sector [4] {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
Firm size [5] {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
Occupation [11] {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
Industry [17] {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
Constant {+} {+} {+} {+} {+} 
      
No. of observations                                       2,479 2,479 2,479 2,479 2,460 
R2   0.073 0.156 0.073 0.095 0.179 
F-statistic                                                      3.92*** 9.00*** 3.84*** 5.02*** 10.10*** 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
COLS job satisfaction regressions. Coefficients and robust standard errors are presented in brackets. The results are 
robust to the use of an ordered probit model.  
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Table 7 
Propensity Score Estimates of Membership/Job Satisfaction Differentials 
 
 Nearest Neighbour Matching Kernel-based Matching 
 No Common 
Support 
Common 
Support 
No Common 
Support 
Common 
Support 
ATT -0.084* -0.085* -0.090** -0.090** 
[S.E.] [0.048] [0.049] [0.039] [0.035] 
|t| 1.77 1.72 2.27 2.53 
     
# Treated 673 594 673 594 
# Control 646 387 2,136 1,827 
 
Notes:  
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 100 replications are displayed for kernel-based matching.  
The probit estimator used to generate the propensity scores conditions on variables that, we argue, are exogenous 
with respect to membership and are liable to affect both membership propensities and job satisfaction. The 
specification is presented in column 2 of Table A2 in the Appendix.  
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Table 8 
Exit-Voice: Quitting Intensions 
 
 
Logit 
Endogenous Switching 
Linear Probability Model 
                                                          
Pooled 
Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
Wald χ2 
Job satisfaction -0.052*** -0.022** -0.049*** 6.94*** 
                                                          [0.006] [0.009] [0.005]  
Trade union member -0.181** - - - 
                                                          [0.075]    
Job satisfaction*Trade union member 0.018 - - - 
                                                          [0.013]    
Log(Net monthly wage) 0.050** 0.072* 0.028 0.90 
                                                          [0.025] [0.040] [0.024]  
Log(Weekly working hours) -0.171*** -0.13 -0.139*** 0.01 
                                                          [0.043] [0.084] [0.040]  
Log(Paid overtime hours) 0.027* 0.03 0.019 0.20 
                                                          [0.014] [0.020] [0.014]  
Male 0.058** 0.087** 0.048* 0.59 
                                                          [0.026] [0.043] [0.026]  
Married                                                   -0.076*** -0.045 -0.073*** 0.34 
                                                          [0.025] [0.041] [0.025]  
Log(No. of children aged less than 16) 0.072*** 0.116*** 0.049** 2.42 
                                                          [0.023] [0.036] [0.023]  
Log(Experience)                                    -0.110*** -0.088** -0.087*** 0.01 
                                                          [0.019] [0.037] [0.018]  
Log(Tenure)                                              -0.087*** -0.106*** -0.050*** 4.00** 
                                                          [0.014] [0.024] [0.015]  
Permanent job 0.141*** 0.190*** 0.113*** 1.20 
                                                          [0.028] [0.063] [0.032]  
Training during the last year 0.015 -0.008 0.026 0.64 
                                                          [0.024] [0.035] [0.024]  
Greece                                        -0.221*** -0.211*** -0.177*** 0.26 
                                                          [0.030] [0.056] [0.036]  
Netherlands                               0.055* -0.105** 0.098*** 12.31*** 
                                                          [0.031] [0.048] [0.032]  
Education [4] {+} {+} {+}  
Sector [4] {+} {+} {+}  
Firm size [5] {+} {+} {+}  
Occupation [11] {+} {+} {+}  
Industry [17] {+} {+} {+}  
Constant {+} {+} {+}  
lnσ - -0.992*** -0.797***  
  [0.030] [0.021]  
ρ - 0.083 0.304**  
  [0.136] [0.144]  
     Observed probability                             0.3729 0.245 0.414  
Derivative adjustment factor                              0.2338 - -  
     No. of observations                                       2,486 2,486  
Pseudo R2                                                 0.168 -  
Log-likelihood                                            -1,366.7 -2,423.2  
LR χ2                                                     550.5*** 180.6***  
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The dependent variable is the intension to quit the firm in the near future. Marginal effects and robust standard 
errors are presented for the logit model; coefficients and robust standard errors for the linear probability model 
with endogenous switching. The first stage regression for union membership in the latter model is presented in 
Column 3 of Table A2 in the Appendix.  
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Table A1 
Summary Statistics: Vignette Attributes 
 
 Pooled Sample Union Workers Non-Union Workers 
 #Obs. (#Inds.)   #Obs. (#Inds.) #Obs. (#Inds.) 
I. Pseudo-panel sample size 14,045 (2,809)   3,365 673 10,680 (2,136) 
         
 Mean (St.Dev.) Min Max Mean (St.Dev.) Mean (St.Dev.) 
II. Outcomes:          
Vignette evaluation (Cardinalised) -0.34 (0.93) -2.063 2.063 -0.41 (0.92) -0.31*** (0.93) 
Vignette evaluation  4.07 (2.66) 0 10 3.86 (2.62)  4.14*** (2.66) 
Vignette acceptability 31.5% (0.46) 0 1 29.0% (0.45) 32.3%*** (0.47) 
         
III. Vignette Attributes:          
Type of Contract:          
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    19.0% (0.39) 0 1 19.2% (0.39) 19.0% (0.39) 
Permanent, risk, compensation                11.6% (0.32) 0 1 11.4% (0.32) 11.6% (0.32) 
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   19.0% (0.39) 0 1 18.0% (0.38) 19.3%* (0.39) 
Temporary, possibility to permanent                   24.0% (0.43) 0 1 24.7% (0.43) 23.8% (0.43) 
Temporary, possibility to temporary           14.7% (0.35) 0 1 14.9% (0.36) 14.7% (0.35) 
Temporary, no continuation 11.7% (0.32) 0 1 11.8% (0.32) 11.6% (0.32) 
Wages and Hours of Work:          
Hours of work per week 36.09 (10.24) 20 50 36.10 (10.34) 36.09 (10.21) 
Percentage wage change -1.0% (0.31) -0.5 0.5 -1.2% (0.31) -0.9% (0.31) 
Working Schedules         
Flexible working hours                                    17.9% (0.38) 0 1 18.4% (0.39) 17.8% (0.38) 
Office working hours                                      28.4% (0.45) 0 1 29.0% (0.45) 28.2% (0.45) 
Rotating shifts                                           31.5% (0.46) 0 1 31.0% (0.46) 31.7% (0.47) 
Employer decides 22.2% (0.42) 0 1 21.6% (0.41) 22.3% (0.42) 
Days of Training:          
30-90 days 29.3% (0.46) 0 1 29.0% (0.45) 29.4% (0.46) 
5-10 days 45.1% (0.50) 0 1 44.8% (0.50) 45.2% (0.50) 
0-1 days 25.0% (0.43) 0 1 25.6% (0.44) 24.9% (0.43) 
Work Organisation         
Job not in teamwork                                       29.5% (0.46) 0 1 29.9% (0.46) 29.4% (0.46) 
Job in varying teamwork                                   29.6% (0.46) 0 1 28.7% (0.45) 29.9% (0.46) 
Job has a fixed routine 40.8% (0.49) 0 1 41.4% (0.49) 40.7% (0.49) 
Control over Work         
Job has a fixed routine                                   40.9% (0.49) 0 1 41.6% (0.49) 40.7% (0.49) 
You can choose the order of tasks                         32.5% (0.47) 0 1 32.3% (0.47) 32.6% (0.47) 
No one controls your work 26.5% (0.44) 0 1 26.2% (0.44) 26.6% (0.44) 
Work Intensity         
Often working at high speed                           28.3% (0.45) 0 1 28.6% (0.45) 28.2% (0.45) 
Sometimes working at high speed                           12.5% (0.33) 0 1 12.0% (0.33) 12.7% (0.33) 
Never working at high speed                        16.8% (0.37) 0 1 16.8% (0.37) 16.8% (0.37) 
Often tight deadlines                                     16.8% (0.37) 0 1 16.9% (0.38) 16.7% (0.37) 
Sometimes tight deadlines                                 15.7% (0.36) 0 1 15.8% (0.36) 15.7% (0.36) 
Never tight deadlines                              9.4% (0.29) 0 1 9.3% (0.29) 9.4% (0.29) 
Age of Retirement:          
65 years of age 11.6% (0.32) 0 1 12.2% (0.33) 11.4% (0.32) 
60 years of age 25.2% (0.43) 0 1 25.0% (0.43) 25.3% (0.43) 
55 years of age 20.0% (0.40) 0 1 19.8% (0.40) 20.0% (0.40) 
No formal retirement age/Inapplicable 43.3% (0.50) 0 1 43.1% (0.50) 43.3% (0.50) 
Behavioural Norms:          
Loyalty and no shirking 55.9% (0.50) 0 1 56.5% (0.50) 55.7% (0.50) 
No loyalty and shirking 44.1% (0.50) 0 1 43.5% (0.50) 44.3% (0.50) 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01: From a t-test of differences in the means between union and non-union workers. 
For the ordinal vignette evaluation the difference between the two groups is significant at the 1% level, using a Mann-
Whitney test, and a robust rank order test.  
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Table A2 
Trade Union Membership Regressions (1st stage) for the Endogenous Switching Models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
I. Instruments:       
Union concentration                                           0.269***  [0.024]      0.274***  [0.023]      0.271***  [0.022]    
Union recognition                                             0.068**   [0.033]      0.216***  [0.057]      0.218***  [0.055]    
II. Current Job Characteristics:       
Log(Net monthly wage)                                                    0.018  [0.018]    0.018  [0.018]    0.020  [0.019]    
Log(Weekly working hours)                                                   0.043  [0.035]    0.028  [0.034]    0.025  [0.034]    
Log(Paid overtime hours)                                               -  0.013  [0.010]    0.015  [0.011]    
Male                                                     0.047**   [0.020]       0.049**   [0.020]       0.044**   [0.021]    
Married                                                -0.019  [0.019]    -0.024  [0.019]    -0.023  [0.020]    
Log(No. of children aged<16)                                                0.024  [0.017]    0.02  [0.018]    0.021  [0.018]    
Log(Experience)                                               0.046***  [0.017]      0.049***  [0.017]      0.050***  [0.016]    
Log(Tenure)                                                   0.063***  [0.011]      0.064***  [0.011]      0.062***  [0.011]    
Training during the last year                                               0.017  [0.019]    0.014  [0.019]    0.021  [0.019]    
Job Satisfaction                                           -  -   -0.015***  [0.004]    
Education:        
Low education                                                -0.060  [0.048]    -  -  
Pre-primary and primary                                                  -  0.002  [0.028]    0.001  [0.028]    
Lower secondary                                                  -  -0.041  [0.029]    -0.043  [0.028]    
Upper secondary [Ref.]  [Ref.]  [Ref.]  
Post secondary non-tertiary                                                  -  0.002  [0.022]    0.001  [0.022]    
Type of Contract:       
Permanent contract                                              -  -0.039  [0.031]    -0.033  [0.031]    
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    -0.016  [0.039]    -  -  
Permanent, risk, compensation                0.009  [0.043]    -  -  
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   0.007  [0.045]    -  -  
Temporary, possibility to permanent                   0.086  [0.080]    -  -  
Temporary, possibility to temporary           0.064  [0.071]    -  -  
Temporary, no continuation [Ref.]  -  -  
Working Schedules       
Fixed working hours                                             -0.077**   [0.035]    -  -  
Rotating shifts                                            0.002  [0.037]    -  -  
Variable, employee decides                                    -0.105***  [0.027]    -  -  
Variable, negotiated -0.084***  [0.030]    -  -  
Variable, employer decides  [Ref.]      
Work Organisation       
Job not in teamwork                                       -0.015  [0.024]    -  -  
Job in varying teamwork                                   -0.034  [0.021]    -  -  
Job has a fixed routine [Ref.]      
Control over Work       
Job has a fixed routine                                   0.015  [0.035]    -  -  
You can choose the order of tasks                         -0.021  [0.032]    -  -  
No one controls your work [Ref.]      
Work Intensity:       
Often working at high speed                           -0.014  [0.029]    -  -  
Sometimes working at high speed                           -0.010  [0.026]    -  -  
Never working at high speed                        [Ref.]      
Often tight deadlines                                     -0.010  [0.029]    -  -  
Sometimes tight deadlines                                 -0.004  [0.028]    -  -  
Never tight deadlines                              [Ref.]      
Retirement:       
Log(Formal retirement age)                                                  0.045  [0.265]    -  -  
Has to retire younger than 65                                              0.052  [0.032]    -    
III. Vignette Attributes:        
Log(Weekly working hours)                                         -0.596  [0.363]    -  -  
Log(Weekly working hours) squared                                 0.089*    [0.052]    -  -  
Table A2 continued in next page 
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Table A2 continued from last page 
% Net wage change                                 -0.007  [0.011]    -  -  
Log(Days of training) -0.003  [0.003]    -  -  
Age of retirement -0.001  [0.001]    -  -  
Age of retirement squared 0.018  [0.018]    -  -  
Loyalty and no shirking                                0.003  [0.006]    -  -  
Type of Contract:        
Permanent, no risk of losing job                    0.009  [0.013]    -  -  
Permanent, risk, compensation                0.005  [0.015]    -  -  
Permanent, risk, no compensation                   -0.014  [0.017]    -  -  
Temporary, possibility to permanent                   0.014  [0.021]    -  -  
Temporary, possibility to temporary           0.012  [0.015]    -  -  
Temporary, no continuation [Ref.]      
Working Schedules       
Flexible working hours                                    0.007  [0.017]    -    
Office working hours                                      0.007  [0.015]    -  -  
Rotating shifts                                           0.002  [0.011]    -  -  
Employer decides [Ref.]      
Work Organisation       
Job not in teamwork                                       -0.006  [0.009]    -  -  
Job in varying teamwork                                   -0.013  [0.009]    -  -  
Job has a fixed routine [Ref.]      
Control over Work       
Job has a fixed routine                                   -0.01  [0.011]    -  -  
You can choose the order of tasks                         -0.011  [0.012]    -  -  
No one controls your work [Ref.]      
Work Intensity       
Often working at high speed                           [Ref.]      
Sometimes working at high speed                           -0.003  [0.014]    -  -  
Never working at high speed                        -0.006  [0.014]    -  -  
Often tight deadlines                                     0.003  [0.015]    -  -  
Sometimes tight deadlines                                 -0.010  [0.014]    -  -  
Never tight deadlines                              -0.011  [0.012]    -  -  
IV. Other Control Variables:        
Sector [4] {+}  {+}  {+}  
Firm size [5] {+}  {+}  {+}  
Occupation [11] {+}  {+}  {+}  
Industry [17] {+}  {+}  {+}  
Country [3] {+}  {+}  {+}  
Constant {+}  {+}  {+}  
                                                                
Average predicted probability                             0.2426 0.2413 0.2402 
Derivative adjustment factor                              0.1837 0.1831 0.1825 
Observed probability                                      0.2418 0.2404 0.2396 
 No. of observations                                       12,385 2,471 2,479 
Pseudo R2                                                 0.265 0.252 0.258 
Log-likelihood                                            -5,033.6 -1,019.4 -1,013.3 
χ2                                                      605.9*** 519.2*** 703.4*** 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable: Trade union membership. Marginal effects and robust 
standard errors from probit models. Model I has clustered standard errors at the individual level. The corresponding 2nd 
stage equations are for: (1) Vignette Evaluation (Table 5); (2) Job satisfaction (Table 7); (3) Quitting intension (Table 8).  
 
